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The Constitutional Logic of the
Common Law
Douglas E. Edlin*
ABSTRACT

This Article uses two concepts from philosophical logic, the
transitive property and syllogistic reasoning, to examine the
history and theory of the common law. More specifically, the

Article uses the transitive property to challenge the claims of
sovereignty theorists that parliamentary supremacy is truly the

most fundamental historicaland theoretical basis of the British
constitution. Instead, the transitiveproperty helps show that the
history and theory of the common law traditionhas long provided
a role for independent courts in maintainingthe rule of law as a

foundational principle of the British constitution. The Article
then closely analyzes the reasoning of Marbury v. Madison to
trace through two syllogisms the legal bases for the Constitution's
and the courts' authority, demonstrating that Chief Justice

Marshallgrounded these sources of authority differently in his
opinion. The Article uses these two syllogisms to challenge the
view that the courts' exercise of judicial review must depend,
logically or legally, on the existence of a written constitution.
Taken together, these two elements of logical reasoninghelp show
historical and theoretical affinities between the US and the UK
constitutional traditions that run deeper than the existence of

parliamentary sovereignty in the United Kingdom or a written
Constitution in the United States.
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For judicial control, particularly over discretionary power, is a constitutional
fundamental. In their self-defensive campaign the judges have almost given us
a constitution, establishing a kind of entrenched provision to the effect that even
Parliament cannot deprive them of their proper function. They may be
discovering a deeper constitutional logic than the crude absolute of statutory
omnipotence.'

I. INTRODUCTION
"In republican government," James Madison writes, "the
legislative authority necessarily predominates."2 In constitutional
republics, a central conceptual challenge
involves reconciling
democratic will and legal constraints on government. 3 The famous

solution of Madison (and his compatriots) was to divide the powers of
government horizontally and vertically and to commit the powers of
the national legislature to paper, alongside the procedural and
substantive constraints upon that power. 4 The answer in the United
States also involves recognizing the judiciary's independent authority
to review the acts of the legislature to ensure their compliance with the
Constitution's constraints upon the legislature's power. 5
In UK government, Albert Dicey explains,
[t]wo features have at all times since the Norman Conquest characterized the
political institutions of England. The first of these features is the omnipotence
or undisputed . . . sovereignty of Parliament . . . The second of these features,
which is closely connected with the first, is the rule or supremacy of law. 6

The UK constitution 7 is famously unwritten, and the conventional view
of parliamentary sovereignty is that the powers of the national

1.

H.W.R. WADE, CONSTITUTIONAL FUNDAMENTALS 87 (rev. ed. 1989).

2.
THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 269 (James Madison) (George W. Carey & James
McClellan eds., 2001).
3.
See, e.g., T.R.S. Allan, Legislative Supremacy and the Rule of Law: Democracy
and Constitutionalism, 44 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 111, 111-12 (1985).
4.
See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9 (establishing express limitations on the
legislative branch's power); id. amends. I, IV, V, VI (introducing further limitations on
the legislature).
5.
See THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton) (discussing the
constitutional role of the judiciary and the judicial review powers). By mentioning
legislative power in the text I do not mean to suggest that the courts cannot review acts
of other governmental institutions and actors to ensure their constitutionality.
6.

A.V. DIcEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSUTTUIoN

107 (8th ed. 1982).
7.
Although Dicey refers to England in the previous quotation, I will refer to the
constitution of the UK or Britain, because Dicey's conception is generally taken as the
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8
legislature are legally illimitable. According to this view, the judiciary
lacks the authority to ensure that acts of the legislature comply with
the UK constitution, because this would be tantamount to subjecting
9
parliamentary power to a legal limitation.

.

orthodox understanding of the British constitution, within and beyond England itself.
That said, it is equally important to recognize the devolution of political authority to and
the independent legal traditions within the separate nations of Britain. And I would be
remiss if I failed to note, as Colin Picker reminds us, that "Scotland is not England ...
[B]eing Scottish is not the same as being English. Indeed, being English is not the same
as being British, as the Welsh and Northern Irish will attest. . . . Clearly, from a
geographical perspective, Scotland is not England. One look at the geography of the
United Kingdom will convince the most skeptical observer that they are indeed different
countries. Furthermore, the cultures are very different, the histories until the Union
were very different, and arguably have remained different even since then. . .
Linguistically, the Scots speak a different form of English, and even have their own
language, still spoken by some in the Highlands and the Scottish Islands. The number
of differences is countless." Colin B. Picker, "ALight unto the Nations"-The New British
Federalism, the Scottish Parliament,and ConstitutionalLessons for Multiethnic States,
77 TUL. L. REV. 1, 4-5 (2002). One difference germane to this article is that Scotland was
more substantially influenced by continental legal tradition than was England. See R.C.
VAN CAENEGEM, THE BIRTH OF THE ENGLISH COMMON LAW 104 (2d ed. 1988); KONRAD
ZWEIGERT & HEIN K6Tz, AN INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW 202-03 (3d ed. 1998).

.

Another is the contrast between conceptions of sovereignty in Scottish and English
constitutional law and theory. See generally MacCormick v. Lord Advocate, [1953] SC
396, 411 (Scot.) ("The principle of the unlimited sovereignty of Parliament is a
distinctively English principle which has no counterpart in Scottish constitutional law.
.. [It] was widely popularised during the nineteenth century by Bagehot and Dicey, the
latter having stated the doctrine in its classic form in his Law of the Constitution."). See
also James E. Pfander & Daniel D. Birk, Article II and the Scottish Judiciary, 124 HARV.
L. REV. 1613, 1617-18 (2011) (contrasting the differences in Parliament's ability to
remodel courts in England and Scotland).
is a
See generally DICEY, supra note 6, at 27 ("[T]he term 'sovereignty' ...
8.
merely legal conception, and means simply the power of law-making unrestricted by any
legal limit. . . . [T]he sovereign power under the English constitution is clearly
'Parliament.' "). This is the definition adopted by most contemporary sovereignty
See,
theorists.
CONTEMPORARY

JEFFREY
e.g.,
57
DEBATES

("[L]egislative sovereignty ...
9.

SOVEREIGNTY:
PARLIAMENTARY
GOLDSWORTHY,
DEBATES]
CONTEMPORARY
[hereinafter
(2010)

[means] legislative power that is legally unlimited.").

See WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 1 COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 66,

67 (Ruth Paley ed., 2016) [1765] ("[I]f the parliament will positively enact a thing to be
[can] control it ... [T]here
done which is unreasonable, I know of no power .. . that ...
is no court that has power to defeat the intent of the legislature, when couched in such
evident and express words, as leave no doubt whether it was the intent of the legislature
or no."). Contemporary sovereignty theorists who attempt to harmonize absolute
sovereignty and the rule of law can be read as adapting Blackstone's comment as a
judicial presumption regarding Parliament's legislative intentions. According to this
view, while the courts may not review primary legislation for constitutionality, they may
properly assume that it is always Parliament's intention to legislate in accordance with
the rule of law and, in particular, that Parliament would never (in the absence of
unmistakably clear and explicit intentions to the contrary) delegate authority to an
administrative or executive actor to violate the law. See, e.g., MARK ELLIOTT, THE
CONSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 109 (2001). For instances of courts

employing this assumption when reviewing government action, see, e.g., AXA Gen. Ins.,
Ltd. v. Lord Advocate [2011] UKSC 46, [152] (declaring that Parliament is presumed not
to break the principle of legality unless there is clear evidence to the contrary); R v. Sec'y
of State for the Home Dep't, ex parte Pierson [1998] AC 539, 575 (HL) (appeal taken from
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In the Anglo-American common law tradition, the challenge of
reconciling democracy and constitutionalism has led the United States
and the United Kingdom to develop contrasting methods of balancing
the rule of the people and the rule of law.1 0 According to the
conventional view, constitutional rights in the United States are
protected by the courts "against" the interests of the majority,"I
whereas in the United Kingdom, constitutional rights are defined by
Parliament in the best interests of the British people.' 2 While it is
somewhat misleading to view the courts' role in the United States
simply as protecting individual or minority rights against the
majority,1 3 I will discuss the dynamic in those terms because it is
accurate to a meaningful extent and, in any case, its widespread
acceptance is most important here. According to the familiar
understanding of each nation's constitutional system, US courts
possess the power to enforce constitutional limitations on legislative
power because the Constitution provides the courts with the legal basis
for doing so.1 4 Conversely, UK courts lack the power to rule acts of
Parliament unconstitutional because there is no foundational written
charter on which the courts can rely. 15

Wales) (Lord Browne-Wilkinson) ("A power conferred by Parliament in general terms is
not to be taken to authorise the doing of acts by the donee of the power which adversely
affect the legal rights of the citizen or the basic principles on which the law of the United
Kingdom is based unless the statute conferring the power makes it clear that such was
the intention of Parliament."). Id. at 591 (Lord Steyn) ("Unless there is the clearest
provision to the contrary, Parliament must be presumed not to legislate contrary to the
rule of law.").
10.
See Allan, supra note 3, at 140-41.
11.
The classic expression of this view is that the exercise of this power by courts
is "counter-majoritarian." See generally ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS
BRANcH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 16-17 (2d ed. 1986) ("[W]hen the

Supreme Court declares unconstitutional a legislative act or the action of an elected
executive, it thwarts the will of representatives of the actual people of the here and now;
it exercises control, not in behalf of the prevailing majority, but against it."). A similar
assumption underlies the occasional statements by British constitutional theorists that
Parliament possesses a democratic standing that the courts do not. See, e.g., Christopher
Forsyth, Heat and Light: A Plea for Reconciliation, in JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE
CONSTITUTION 394 (Christopher Forsyth ed., 2000) ("Parliament speaks, and one trusts
always will speak, with a democratic legitimacy the judges, however independent and no
matter how respected, will always lack.").
12.

See CONTEMPORARY DEBATES, supra note 8, at 79.

13.
See, e.g., Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme
Court as a NationalPolicy-Maker, 6 J. PUB. L. 279, 283-85, 294 (1957).
14.
See, e.g., Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 579 (1972) ("[I]t is a written
Constitution that we apply. Our role is confined to interpretation of that Constitution.").
As I will discuss later, the use of the Constitution as a basis for evaluating exercises of
state power and as the authority for the courts to use the Constitution in this manner
are not the same thing.
15.
See, e.g., Anthony Lester, The Overseas Trade in the American Bill of Rights,
88 COLUM. L. REV. 537, 549 (1988) ("Acts of Parliament are not subject to judicial review
on the ground that they are repugnant to the superior, paramount law of a written
constitution."); Louis H. Pollak, Judging Under the Aegis of the Third Article, 51 CASE
W. RES. L. REV. 399, 417 (2001) ("It is, of course, a hornbook platitude that, lacking a
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The prevailing view is that the United States and the United

Kingdom take divergent approaches toward judicial protection of
fundamental rights because of the presence of a written constitution
(and the absence of legislative supremacy) in the United States and the
absence of a written constitution (and the presence of parliamentary
sovereignty)

in

the

United

Kingdom.1 6

This

conventional

understanding is misguided in two ways. First, the common law
foundation of the UK constitution and the courts' historic authority to
reform and refine the common law are the authentic basis for a judicial
contribution to defining the scope and content of constitutional rights
and legal constraints on government in the United Kingdom.1 7 Second,

the codification of the US Constitution does not, in fact or in theory,
provide the legal foundation for judicial enforcement of constitutional

rights and constraints on government action in the United States.18
As a preliminary point of departure, it is misleading to
differentiate the US and UK constitutions on the basis that the former

is written while the latter is not-the presence of a written constitution
in the United States does not and should not preclude the recognition
and protection of unenumerated rights and unwritten constitutional
principles,1 9 and the absence of a codified charter in the United

written constitution, Britain does not have an American-style system of judicial
review.").
See, e.g., Vanhorne's Lessee v. Dorrance, 2 U.S. 304, 308 (C.C.D. Pa. 1795)
16.
("[I]n England, the authority of the Parliament runs without limits, and rises above
controul. It is difficult to say what the constitution of England is; because, not being
reduced to written certainty and precision, it lies entirely at the mercy of the Parliament.
...
[T]he validity of an act of Parliament cannot be drawn into question by the judicial
department: It cannot be disputed, and must be obeyed... . Besides, in England there is
no written constitution, no fundamental law, nothing visible, nothing real, nothing
certain, by which a statute can be tested. In America the case is widely different: Every
State in the Union has its constitution reduced to written exactitude and precision. What
is a Constitution? It is the form of government, delineated by the mighty hand of the
people, in which certain first principles of fundamental laws are established. The
Constitution is certain and fixed; it contains the permanent will of the people, and is the
supreme law of the land; it is paramount to the power of the Legislature, and can be
revoked or altered only by the authority that made it."); Gordon Van Kessel, The Suspect
as a Source of Testimonial Evidence: A Comparison of the English and American
Approaches, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 130 (1986) ("Although the United States and England
entertain similar values, the approaches we take toward satisfying those values in many
respects diverge considerably. . . . Lacking a written constitution and judicial power to
override legislative acts, England gives its judicial system fewer tools with which to
protect individual rights when confronted with the popular will. The intent of the
majority, as embodied in an act of Parliament, is the last word in England, while in the
United States some of the most intractable national conflicts . .. are ultimately resolved
by the judiciary acting as the ultimate interpreter of the Constitution.").
See infra note 119 and accompanying text.
17.
See JAMES MCCLELLAN, LIBERTY, ORDER, AND JUSTIcE: AN INTRODUCTION TO
18.
THE CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES OF AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 2-3 (3d ed. 2000).
See generally Thomas C. Grey, The Uses of an Unwritten Constitution, 64
19.
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 211, 216, 217, 218 (1988) ("The British have an unwritten
constitution; we have a written one-so most people familiar with our practices would
say. I want to say that we have both... . To begin with, the American Revolution was
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Kingdom does not mean that no foundational texts exist to define
certain constitutional rights and principles of that system. 20 Both the
US and the UK constitutions are grounded in the texts and principles
of the common law tradition, which is defined in part by the generative
(and nonexhaustive) set of sources that help to distinguish that
tradition.2 1 Each nation has its own distinct legal sources and its own

distinctive legal tradition, to be sure, but it is a mistake to attempt to
disconnect or isolate one common law nation's legal culture entirely
from the broader common law world of which it is a part. 2 2

made by a generation of lawyers and pamphleteers who believed in and were used to
arguing on the basis of a legally supreme and yet unwritten English or British
constitution. This generation accepted a binding body of higher law, conceived as an
amalgam of the rights of man and the birthrights of Englishmen. This conception then
appeared in the earliest exercises of judicial review, immediately after independence...
. The 'property' and 'liberty' protected by the due process clauses supplied the textual
basis for constitutionally protected unenumerated rights, and there was no further need
for any explicit doctrine of an unwritten constitution."). And the Ninth Amendment
makes this explicit. See U.S. CONsT. amend. IX ("The enumeration in the Constitution,
of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the
people.").
20.
See R (HS2 Action All. Ltd.) v. Sec'y of State for Transp. [2014] UKSC 3, [207]
(appeal taken from Eng.) ('The United Kingdom has no written constitution, but we have
a number of constitutional instruments. They include Magna Carta, the Petition of Right
1628, the Bill of Rights and (in Scotland) the Claim of Rights Act 1689, the Act of
Settlement 1701 and the Act of Union 1707. . . . The common law itself also recognises
certain principles as fundamental to the rule of law."). See also ERIC BARENDT, AN
INTRODUCTION TO CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 32, 33 (1998) ("According to Dicey, the United

Kingdom has an unwritten, or partly unwritten, constitution. That proposition is
acceptable inasmuch as it is another way of stating that there is no single authoritative
text. But it is quite inaccurate if it is taken to mean that there is no written constitutional
law. For much of the constitution, and certainly all constitutional law, is written. There
are in the first place many important statutes. . . . Secondly, of course, court decisions
are written.... The constitution is therefore very largely a written one. The point is that
it is uncodified. It is a jumble of diffuse statutes and court rulings, supplemented by
extra-legal conventions and practices. It has also been described as a common law
constitution."); S.E. FINER, VERNON BOGDANOR & BERNARD RUDDEN, COMPARING
CONSTITUTIONS 42-43 (1995) ("The [UK] constitution is a rag-bag of statutes and judicial
interpretations thereof, of conventions, of the Law and Custom of Parliament, of common
law principle, and jurisprudence.").
21.
See George Anastaplo, The Constitutionof 1787: A Commentary 157-58 (1989)
("For the British, more of their Constitution is written than we usually recognize, for it
includes such celebrated parts as Magna Carta, the Petition of Right, and the Habeas
Corpus Act. On the other hand, for Americans, more of their Constitution is unwritten
than we recognize, for it includes reliance upon such things as an accepted mode of
interpretation, the common law ... "). This was a point that Dicey himself appreciated.
See DICEY, supra note 6, at 314 n.13 ("It is well worth notice that the Constitution of the
United States, as it actually exists, rests to a very considerable extent on judge-made
law.").
22.
See infra note 101 and accompanying text.
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THE TRANSITIVE PROPERTY AND THE COMMON LAW CONSTITUTION

Elsewhere, I have discussed at length2 3 the view of Jeffrey
Goldsworthy, 2 4 and others,2 5 that parliamentary sovereignty is best
conceived as the "rule of recognition" of the UK legal system. A rule of
recognition, according to H.L.A. Hart's famous conception, is the legal
norm that identifies the rules of a legal system as distinctively legal
rules, and distinguishes them from other sorts of rules, principally
26
The
through the attitudes and actions of government officials.
of
defenders
contemporary
to
according
important point is that,
absolute parliamentary sovereignty, the rule of recognition is defined
27
by the actions of all officials of government, not by judges alone. And

in this respect, Goldsworthy argues that sovereignty serves better than
the common law as the historical and conceptual foundation of the UK
constitution.28

In defending
provenance,

his

claims

Goldsworthy

regarding sovereignty's

argues

historical

that parliamentary sovereignty

possesses a longer lineage in English legal history than common law
constitutionalism. 29 He disregards statements of the common law as

See Douglas E. Edlin, The Rule of Recognition and the Rule of Law:
23.
Departmentalism and Constitutional Development in the United States and the United
Kingdom, 64 AM. J. COMP. L. 371, 375-76, 401-09 (2016) [hereinafter The Rule of
Recognition and the Rule of Law].
See JEFFREY GOLDSWORTHY, THE SOVEREIGNTY OF PARLIAMENT: HISTORY
24.
AND PHILOSOPHY 234 (1999) [hereinafter THE SOVEREIGNTY OF PARLIAMENT] ("[F]or

many centuries there has been a sufficient consensus among all three branches of
government in Britain to make the sovereignty of Parliament a rule of recognition in
H.L.A. Hart's sense. . .").
See, e.g., Patrick Elias, Retired Lord Justice of Appeal, Annual Lord Renton
25.
Lecture, The Rise of the Strasbourgeoisie: Judicial Activism and the ECHR 5 (Nov. 24,
2009) ("Parliamentarysovereignty . .. is a unique rule in that it is the one common law
rule which cannot be abrogated or changed by Parliament. That is because, to use the
language of Professor Hart, it is the fundamental rule of recognition....").
See H.L.A. HART, THE CONcEPT OF LAW 94-95, 100-10 (3d ed. 2012)
26.
[hereinafter THE CONCEPT OF LAW].
27.
See CONTEMPORARY DEBATES, supra note 8, at 52-56, 124.
See id. at 14-18.
28.
See CONTEMPORARY DEBATES, supra note 8, at 26-27, 37-38, 42-43, 274-75;
29.
THE SOVEREIGNTY OF PARLIAMENT, supra note 24, at 28-29, 37, 45, 58-59, 74-75, 105,
134-35, 140-41, 157-58, 160-62, 164, 168, 190, 196, 200-01, 216, 227-28. By framing
the issue in this way, Goldsworthy glosses over an important historical challenge to his
argument. During the latter sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the concept of
sovereignty was still principally associated with the sovereign. Although
parliamentarians (and common law judges) were interested in constraining the absolute
sovereignty of the Crown, those arguing in favor of parliamentary authority did not
describe this authority as the sovereignty of Parliament. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER W.
BROOKS, LAW, POLITIcS AND SOCIETY IN EARLY MODERN ENGLAND 80 (2008) ("The role
of the lords and commons in parliament was to consult and consent in deliberations over
the making of laws, but statutes had the force of law only through the royal assent....
[P]arliament was not sovereign ...

"); CHRISTOPHER HILL, THE CENTURY OF REVOLUTION,

1603-1714 52 (2d ed. 1980) ("Only Royalist thinkers had a clear theory of sovereignty.
Parliamentarians . . . den[ied] 'sovereign power' to 'our sovereign Lord the King', but
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authorizing or recognizing parliamentary authority as intermittent
and unimportant. 30 The problem with Goldsworthy's view, and with

the broader

debate itself,

is the

extent to which a positivist

philosophical perspective influences these theorists' interpretations of
the historical record and, in turn, how this view of the history
predetermines their claims about the conceptual framework within
which contemporary debates about rights protection, judicial
authority, and constitutional development should proceed. 3 1 To be
clear, this Article takes no issue with legal positivism as a legal theory.
Indeed, one point of this Article is to explain that legal positivism
compels no conclusion one way or the other about the absolute

sovereignty of Parliament. 32

they did not claim it for Parliament."). More broadly, during this time the courts and
Parliament were primarily asserting their respective authority against the Crown, not
each other. See P.S. ATIYAH & R.S. SUMMERS, FORM AND SUBSTANCE IN ANGLOAMERICAN LAW: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF LEGAL REASONING, LEGAL THEORY, AND

LEGAL INSTITUTIONS 227 (1987) ("Parliament and the common lawyers had been allies
in the seventeenth-century struggles against the Crown; they did not see themselves as
rivals."); George Winterton, The British Grundnorm: Parliamentary Supremacy Reexamined, 92 LAW Q. REV. 591, 595 (1976) ("This alliance and mutual respect between
Parliament and the common lawyers has had a profound effect on the development of
English law, particularly in judicial recognition of parliamentary supremacy and
parliamentary acceptance of judicial independence.").
30.
See CONTEMPORARY DEBATES, supra note 8, at 25-26, 29-33, 39, 42, 46-47,
50-51; THE SOVEREIGNTY OF PARLIAMENT, supra note 24, at 78-79, 109-12, 117, 123-

24, 142-43, 145-46, 197, 203.
31.
In fact, Goldsworthy has argued that the doctrine of parliamentary
sovereignty is itself an expression of legal positivism as a theoretical perspective. See
Jeffrey Goldsworthy, The Real Standard Picture, and How Facts Make It Law: a
Response to Mark Greenberg, 64 AM. J. JURIS. 163, 169 (2019) ("This centuries-old
doctrine [of legislative supremacy] in effect officially adopts legal positivism in relation
to statute law ... "). Goldsworthy's attempt to characterize legislative supremacy as an
inherently positivist doctrine seems unavailing, given that Hart indicates that his work
as a modern positivist may be differentiated from that of earlier positivists "mainly by
its rejection of their imperative theories of law and their conception that all law
emanates from a legally unlimited sovereign legislative person or body." CONCEPT OF
LAW, supra note 26, at 244-45. For a more general picture of the underlying debate,
compare RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 352 (1978) ("I concentrate on the
details of a particular legal system ... not simply to show that positivism provides a poor
account of the system, but to show that positivism provides a poor conception of the
concept of a legal right."), with CONCEPT OF LAW, supra note 26, at 245-48, 268-72
(responding to a number of arguments against legal positivism).
32.
This article also speaks to the value of different iterations and precise
understandings of legal positivism in describing the actual operation of parliamentary
sovereignty in British constitutional government. See, e.g., David Jenkins, From
Unwritten to Written: Transformation in the British Common-Law Constitution, 36
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 863, 934 (2003) ("The Austinian positivist doctrine of
parliamentary sovereignty resists any attempt to circumvent it and place limits upon
the legislative power. The imposition of legal restraints upon Parliament, however, does
not entail a return to natural law theories or require a rejection of positivism. ... Hart's
positivist theory does better than Austin's by describing more complex constitutional
systems that incorporate ideas such as judicial review or the lack of one supreme, lawmaking sovereign. . . ."). For the conception of absolute sovereignty in Austinian
positivism, see JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED 188
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Like many sovereignty theorists, Goldsworthy argues that
legislative supremacy better legitimates representative government in
a democratic system 33 and that common law constitutionalism permits
34
He then
judicial authority to supersede the will of Parliament.

reverts to the rule of recognition in an effort to argue that the decisions
of judges cannot by themselves alter the sovereignty of Parliament as

the central feature of UK constitutional law and theory, which is
35
accurate but somewhat beside the point.
Goldsworthy seeks to challenge the "modest proposition that the
common law 'established the fundamental legal framework' of English
government." 36 In challenging this proposition, Goldsworthy argues
that the courts (and the common law) lack any organic authority to
37
In
define or refine the meaning of the English constitution.
attempting to situate that constitutional limitation historically,

Goldsworthy discusses Matthew

Hale. 38 But here,

Goldsworthy

superimposes his view of the modern British constitution upon his

scholarly assessment of Hale's writing.39 Goldsworthy claims that

(Wilfrid E. Rumble ed., 1995) ("[S]overeign or supreme power is incapable of legal.
limitation, whether it reside in an individual, or in a number of individuals."). See also,.;
id. at 205, 212. For some of Hart's criticisms of Austin on this point, see THE CONcEPT
OF LAW, supra note 26, at 68-71.
See THE SOVEREIGNTY OF PARLIAMENT, supra note 24, at 63-64, 70, 137, 21933.
20. See also Forsyth, supranote 11, at 394-95.
See CONTEMPORARY DEBATES, supra note 8, at 6, 49, 55, 278-79; THE
34.
SOVEREIGNTY OF PARLIAMENT, supra note 24, at 202-03.
See CONTEMPORARY DEBATES, supra note 8, at 110; THE SOVEREIGNTY OF
35.
PARLIAMENT, supranote 24, at 234 ("There can be no doubt that for many centuries there,
has been a sufficient consensus among all three branches of government in Britain to
make the sovereignty of Parliament a rule of recognition in H.L.A. Hart's sense, which
the judges by themselves did not create and cannot unilaterally change.").
Id. at 19 (quoting BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, ON THE RULE OF LAW: HISTORY,
36.
POLITIcS, THEORY 57 (2004)).
See generally THE SOVEREIGNTY OF PARLIAMENT,
37.

supra note 24, at 235

("[J]udges cannot justify [judicial repudiation of the parliamentary sovereignty doctrine]
... on the ground that it would revive a venerable tradition of English law, a golden age
of constitutionalism, in which the judiciary enforced limits to the authority of Parliament
imposed by common law....").
See CONTEMPORARY DEBATES, supranote 8, at 27, 38-42.
38.
More fundamentally, Goldsworthy imposes a positivist conception of law upon
39.
Hale, even though Hale himself rejected the Hobbesian, positivist view of law, along with
Hobbes's absolutist view of legally illimitable sovereignty. See Michael W. McConnell,
Tradition and Constitutionalism Before the Constitution, 1998 U. ILL. L. REV. 173, 18889 (1998) (distinguishing Hale's view of law from Edward Coke's and arguing that
"Coke's logic depended on the assumption that if a law was made during the time of kings
it must have been made by the authority of the King-and hence could be unmade by
that same authority. That follows only if the King is the sole fountainhead of authority:
the sole and exclusive sovereign. If, however, law can be made in a nonpositivistic way,
that is, other than by emanating from the will of the sovereign, then there is no need to
trace 'fundamental law' back to the Saxon forests or to mythical Trojan settlers in
England. The King has no obvious authority to change law that came about, 'insensibly,'
by the course of tradition. Coke had accepted too much of the idea of law as command.
That elements of the common law have come into existence during the time of kings, but

88

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VOL. 53:79

"Hale did not think of the common law as something that could be
altered by judges." 40 Goldsworthy is concerned to establish this point,

because he had just explained that "Hale attributed to the common law
the capacity to change the constitution .. ."41 So the concern that drives
Goldsworthy here is plain enough: if the common law can change the
constittition, and the judges can change the common law, then the
judges can change the constitution.4 2 And given Goldsworthy's
understanding that the British rule of recognition locates in
Parliament the unique and ultimate authority of establishing
constitutional meaning and defining fundamental rights, Goldsworthy
cannot concede that the courts may historically have shared this
constitutional authority and responsibility.4 3
Unfortunately for Goldsworthy, however, Hale did state that the
judges could, through their decisions, alter the common law:
From the Nature of Laws themselves in general, which being to be accommodated
to the Conditions, Exigencies and Conveniences of the People, for or by whom
they are appointed ... so many Times there grows insensibly a Variation of Laws,
especially in a long tract of Time . . . yet it is not possible to assign the certain
Time when the Change began; nor have we all the Monuments or Memorials,
either of Acts of Parliament, or of Judicial Resolutions, which might induce or
occasion such Alterations.... So that Use and Custom, and Judicial Decisions
and Resolutions, and Acts of Parliament, tho' not now extant, might introduce
some New Laws, and alter some Old, which we now take to be the very Common
Law itself. . . 44

have authority independent of the will of the King, does not prove that the law is
vulnerable. It is equally consistent with the theory that the power of the King is limited.
For obvious reasons, Hale did not spell this out, but the implications for absolutism can
be seen in Hobbes's attack on the authority of tradition. Whig constitutionalism, when
considered at its most fundamental level, was antithetical to Hobbes's view of
sovereignty.").
40.
CONTEMPORARY DEBATES, supra note 8, at 40.

41. Id.
42.
See id. at 15 ("Both views ... threaten ...
to replace legislative supremacy
with judicial supremacy. Instead of Parliament being the master of the constitution, with
the ability to change any part of it ... the judges turn out to be in charge.").
43.
See id. at 6-7.
44.
MATTHEW HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW OF ENGLAND 39-40
(Charles M. Gray ed., 1971) [1713] [hereinafter COMMON LAW OF ENGLAND]. See also id.
at 7-8 ("I therefore come down to the Times of those succeeding Kings, . . . and the
Statutes made in the Times of those Kings, . . . [T]hey now seem to have been as it were
a Part of the Common Law, especially considering the many Expositions that have been
made of them . . . whereby as they became the great Subject of Judicial Resolutions and
Decisions; so those Expositions and Decisions, together also with those old Statutes
themselves, are as it were incorporated into the very Common Law, and become a Part of
it."). We should, of course, be careful not to impart contemporary understandings of
precedent and constitutional interpretation to Hale. While he understood judicial
interpretations and expositions of existing law to be a part of the common law, he also
subscribed to the declaratory view of the time that particular judicial decisions were
evidence of the law rather than independent sources of law. See PHILIP HAMBURGER,
LAW AND JUDIcIAL DUTY 228-29 (2008). See also infra note 76.
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This passage reveals a series of problems for Goldsworthy's
analysis. First, and most obviously, the passage expresses Hale's view
that the common law could be altered not just by parliamentary
45
enactments, but also by judicial decisions and customary practices.
Hale's view as a common lawyer was more complex, and more modern,
46
Second, Hale's views undermine
than Goldsworthy wishes to accept.
Goldsworthy's position that parliamentary supremacy in establishing
legal rights was embedded as unquestioned historical fact prior to the
Glorious Revolution. 47 Third, Goldsworthy's mischaracterization of
Hale is emblematic of a pervasive problem with the historical
48
contentions of contemporary defenders of sovereignty. The history of
English constitutional thought is simply not univocal on the question
49
Read carefully, Hale's statement
of parliamentary supremacy.

indicates that the English constitution has long embraced a shared
institutional responsibility among the courts and Parliament for
50
determining the meaning and development of the constitution.
Moreover, this passage adverts to Hale's underlying and "striking

'

5
claim that the common law is the constitution of the English people."

45. See KUNAL M. PARKER, COMMON LAW, HISTORY, AND DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA,

1790-1900: LEGAL THOUGHT BEFORE MODERNISM 27, 43 (2011).
See id. at 37-43.
46.
Hale died in 1676 and his History of the Common Law was first published in
47.
1713. See COMMON LAW OF ENGLAND, supra note 44, at xiii. For further discussion of the
point in the

text, see GLENN BURGESS,

ABSOLUTE MONARCHY AND THE STUART

CONSTITUTION 153 (1996) (explaining the recognition during the Stuart Period that "acts
of misgovernment were usually within the purview of the courts: an administration,
separate from the king, could be policed by a judiciary independent of him."); John H.
Baker, Human Rights and the Rule of Law in Renaissance England, 2 Nw. U. J. INT'L
HUM. RTS. 3, ¶ 23 (2004) ("It is not my contention that the rule of law always prevailed
in Renaissance England, or that human rights as now understood were always
protected-any more than they are at the present day. But it is not so absurd to propose
that the rule of law was an accepted constitutional principle in the Tudor and Stuart
periods, and that many-though certainly not quite all-of the rights now classified as
'human rights' would have been recognized without difficulty by English lawyers of that
period. The principal difference, perhaps, is that in earlier periods the ideals were
embodied within the common law itself and subject to development through precedent.").
See Douglas E. Edlin, Rule Britannia, 52 U. TORONTO L.J. 313, 320 (2002)
48.
[hereinafter Rule Britannia].
See, e.g., Roy Stone de Montpensier, The British Doctrine of Parliamentary
49.
Sovereignty: A CriticalInquiry, 26 LA. L. REv. 753, 754-56 (1966) (arguing that differing
constructions of English history and law have led to the creation of the theory of
parliamentary supremacy).
50.

See COMMON LAW OF ENGLAND, supranote 44, at 43-46.

Gerald J. Postema, ClassicalCommon Law Jurisprudence(PartII), 3 OXFORD
51.
U. COMMONWEALTH L.J. 1, 24 (2003) (emphasis added). See also COMMON LAW OF
ENGLAND, supra note 44, at 30 ("I come now to ... the Common Municipal Law of this
Kingdom, which has the Superintendency of all those other particular Laws used in the
before-mentioned Courts, and is the common Rule for the Administration of common
[F]or it is not only a very just and excellent Law in it
Justice in this great Kingdom ...
self, but it is singularly accommodated to the Frame of the English Government, and to
the Disposition of the English Nation, and such as by a long Experience and Use is as it
were ... become the Complection and Constitution of the English Commonwealth.").
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Hale believed that Parliament and the judiciary had a role to play in
refining the common law, 52 just as Dicey believed that Parliament and
the judiciary had a role to play in defining the English constitution.5 3
Reading these historical and institutional dynamics together, the most
distinctive characteristic of England's common law constitution may in

fact be its capacity for change over time. 54
Here Goldsworthy's broader historical claims about parliamentary
sovereignty intersect with his philosophical orientation as a legal
positivist and help to reveal the relationship between the rule of law
and the rule of recognition in Britain. 55 If the nature of the British
constitution, as the ultimate legal rule of the British legal system, is
best understood through Hart's rule of recognition (as Goldsworthy
believes), then the rule of recognition must be defined through the
beliefs and behaviors of all legal officials, not just judicial officials. 56 So
it is not enough, in Goldsworthy's mind, to explore the historical and
philosophical
bases for common
constitutionalism and
law
parliamentary sovereignty, Goldsworthy must argue that common law
constitutionalism is the myth and parliamentary sovereignty is the
reality. 57 Goldsworthy must also assert, as he does repeatedly, that the
rule of recognition in the British legal system cannot be altered
"unilaterally" by the judiciary.5 8 If parliamentary sovereignty is
ultimately a common law doctrine, however, and the common law can

be altered by the courts (as Hale believed), then the doctrine of
sovereignty as a fundamental principle of the British constitution can

be altered by the courts. 59

52.
See Bernadette Meyler, Towards a Common Law Originalism, 59 STAN. L.
REV. 551, 592 (2006) ("Hale disassociated identity from origin and instead connected it
with the perception of the common law's continuity despite change, and with the polity's
acceptance of a body of common law-and various alterations to it-as law. The common
law thus served, for Hale, as 'the Complection and Constitution of the English
Commonwealth,' a constitution that could smooth over any political disruptions,
including that of the English Revolution. Whether a particular transformation was
effected through judicial decision or statute seemed to make little difference for Hale.").
53.
See infra note 119 and accompanying text. Dicey's statement is part of his
explication of the rule of law as one of the two (along with parliamentary sovereignty)
defining principles of the English constitution. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
54.
See Christine Bell, ConstitutionalTransitions:The Peculiaritiesof the British
Constitution and the Politicsof Comparison, [2014] PUB. L. 446, 457 ("The very essence
of British constitutionalism is that it claims change as continuity, and enshrines ongoing capacity for change as its grundnorm . . . [T]he commitment to an unwritten
constitution is often assumed to be itself a commitment to a type of political
constitutionalism that prioritises political change within a narrative of continuity as the
constitution's key core commitment.").
55.
See The Rule of Recognition and the Rule of Law, supra note 23, at 414-15.
56.
See supra notes 24, 27-28 and accompanying text.
57.

See CONTEMPORARY DEBATES, supra note 8, at 14-15, 57-61.

58.
See id. at 45-46, 52-55, 96, 113-14, 267, 317.
59.
See, e.g., R (Jackson) v. Att'y Gen. [2005] UKHL 56, [102] (appeal taken from
Eng. & Wales) (Lord Steyn) ("[T]he supremacy of Parliament is still the general principle
of our constitution. It is a construct of the common law. The judges created this principle.

2020]

THE CONSTITUTIONAL LOGIC OF THE COMMON LAW

91

The critical point that Goldsworthy misses is the distinction
between the rule of recognition and the constitution.60 Given that the
rule of recognition is the social rule by which the rules of law in the

British legal system-including the law of the constitution-are
identified, the British constitution exists apart from what Parliament
may, at any given time, enact legislatively (even if the legislation that
is enacted would alter a rule of British constitutional law). In other
61
words, the rule of recognition must be distinct from the constitution.
62
Parliament can enact legislation
Hale implicitly understood this.

that alters the British constitution, but the precise meaning of the
alteration that Parliament has effected cannot be understood simply
by reading the legislation. 63 It can be understood only after seeing,
customarily through judicial decisions interpreting the statute, what

precisely the statute succeeded in changing. 64 For Hale, this meant
that the constitution exists within the institutional dynamics of
government over time, and has meaning apart from what a political
65
actor or institution may occasionally do, or try to do.

For Hale, the common law was the compendium of English law,
which included and incorporated parliamentary enactments and
customary practices. 66 As the fundamental source of legal authority,
the common law was itself the constitution of the English polity, and
judicial decisions (and parliamentary enactments) reflected and
contributed to a shared understanding of the common law as the
constitution. 67 Gerald Postema explains this as Hale's view that

If that is so, it is not unthinkable that circumstances could arise where the courts may
have to qualify a principle established on a different hypothesis of constitutionalism.").
See also id. at [126]. But cf. CONTEMPoRARY DEBATES, supra note 8, at 50 ("[T]here is an
incongruity between the legal doctrine that the courts are obligated to obey statutes;
because Parliament is sovereign, and the theory that the courts can at any time release
themselves from the obligation, because Parliament's sovereignty is their creation, and
subject to their control.").
See The Rule of Recognition and the Rule of Law, supra note 23, at 403-07.
60.
See Joseph Raz, On the Authority and Interpretation of Constitutions: Some
61.
Preliminaries, in CONSTITUTIONALISM: PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS

160-61 (Larry

Alexander ed., 1998).
See generally COMMON LAw OF ENGLAND, supra note 44.
See Rule Britannia, supra note 48, at 321-22.
63.
This was Dicey's view, as well. See DICEY, supra note 6, at 273 ("Parliament
64.
is supreme legislator, but from the moment Parliament has uttered its will as lawgiver,
that will becomes subject to the interpretation put upon it by the judges of the land...").
See ALAN CROMARTIE, SIR MATTHEw HALE, 1609-1676: LAw, RELIGION AND
65.
NATURAL PHILOSOPHY 57, 105 (1995); see also JOHN PHILLIP REID, RULE OF LAw: THE
62.

JURISPRUDENCE OF LIBERTY IN THE SEVENTEENTH AND EIGHTEENTH CENTURIES 84

(2004) ("Hale's law was a law that ruled over men. He did not mean that law won out
over power in every instance. . . . But in England over time rule-of-law rebounded to
make new precedents and to place new hedges around liberty.").
See generally COMMON LAW OF ENGLAND, supra note 44, at 44 ("The formal
66.
Constituents . . . of the Common Law . . . [are] [t]he Common Usage, or Custom, and
Practice of this Kingdom . .. [t]he Authority of Parliament, introducing such Laws; and
[ ] [t]he Judicial Decisions of Courts of Justice .. ").
See id. at 39-46.
67.
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"English common law is a composite of lex scripta and lex non
scripta."68 For Hale, these terms did not correspond simply to written
and unwritten law-instead, lex scripta were laws that acquired their
authority through their enactment by a "recognized lawmaking
body." 6 9 Lex non scripta were laws that acquired their authority
through their ongoing use in practice by which they were incorporated
"into the systematic body of law." 70 With this distinction, Hale
perceived what we now understand to be a distinction between
constitutional law and the law derived from and validated by the
constitution. 71 As the "constitution of civil government," Hale
understood that through the lex non scripta, "[a]ll governing powerlegislative as well as adjudicative, royal as well as parliamentary-is
ordained, constituted, structured, and limited by this law." 72
So in Hale's view, while an individual judicial decision did not fix
the content of the constitution, the decision could and did express with
distinctive authority the meaning of the common law as a framework
of legal principles and reasoning, and that law was, as Hale himself
put it, "the Frame of the English Government." 73 In the end, then,

Hale's own words are the greatest challenge to Goldsworthy's attempt
to argue that the common law is not the framework of English
government. 74 As the legal basis of the government's authority, the
principles of the common law determined how the exercise of the
government's authority and Parliament's legislation would be
understood and expressed by courts. 75 And the courts' expression in
their judgments of their understanding of this authority was evidence
of the law as it was taken to govern the actions of the government and
the meaning of Parliament's enactments. 76 As evidence of the law that

68.
See GERALD J. POSTEMA, Editor's Introduction, in MATTHEW HALE: ON THE
LAW OF NATURE, REASON, AND COMMON LAW xxxix (2017) [hereinafter ON THE LAW OF
NATURE, REASON, AND COMMON LAW].

69.
70.
71.
72.

Id.
Id.
See id.
Id.

73.

COMMON LAw OF ENGLAND, supra note 44, at 30.

74.
See supra notes 36-41 and accompanying text.
75.
See The Rule of Recognition and the Rule of Law, supra note 23, at 376-77.
76.
For more on judicial decisions as evidence of the law, see generally Harold J.
Berman & Charles J. Reid, Jr., The Transformationof English Legal Science: From Hale
to Blackstone, 45 EMORY L.J. 437, 448-49 (1996) ("A line of judicial decisions consistently
applying a legal principle or legal rule to various analogous fact-situations is 'evidence,'
in Hale's formulation, of the existence and the validity of such a principle or rule. The
decisions are not only 'examples' of the principle or rule, but also 'proof of its reception
by the judiciary and hence a source of its binding force. Judges, to be sure, do not 'make'
laws, but 'find' them in the received legal tradition and 'declare' them. This 'declaratory
theory,' as it is often called, means that the source of law in precedent is itself linked to
the source of law in custom, which in turn is linked to the source of law in
'reasonableness,' as the moral element in law was then called for the first time. The link
with reasonableness leaves room for courts to overrule even longpracticed error. Yet
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constrains government action and guides statutory interpretation, the

common law functions as the English constitution because the powers
of the state and the meaning of legislation cannot be understood in any

way other than through the preexisting legal principles and forms of
reasoning and judgment that have always been used to understand
77
Parliament cannot
state power and parliamentary enactments.

legislate and the government cannot act outside of or apart from the
constitutional environment in which legislation and government action
is understood according to the principles and traditions of the common

law.7
Hale's focus

in his time was on the Crown's power, and he

recognized the authority of the courts to enforce legal constraints on
the executive. 79 As Glenn Burgess put it:
Hale seems to be saying that illegal acts of prerogative could-at least in some
cases-be effectively ignoredby the courts. The courts would simply find that
actions performed by means other than those of due legal process were void in
80
the sense that the courts would not uphold them.

In Hale's terms, the law possesses an "invalidating power," or
"potestas irritans," which consists of "the power to make acts void if
they are against the law. Thus the sovereignty of the king exists within
a legal framework."81 Hale distinguished this power from the "coercive
power," or "potestas coerciva." 8 2 On this view the king was not
83
understood to be under the direct coercive power of the laws, but he

-

reasonableness itself, in the seventeenth-century English sense, had a historical
dimension.").
See COMMON LAW OF ENGLAND, supra note 44, at 44-46.
77.
See infra note 99.
78.
See generally COMMON LAW OF ENGLAND, supra note 44.
79.
BURGESS, supra note 48, at 139-40. As Burgess goes on to explain, this
80.
understanding apprehends the functional operation of legal constraints on government
power through institutional dynamics. The notion of the king "having 'absolute'
prerogatives" whose authority was recognized as "partof the law" was consistent with
"the fact that the king could not act contrary to common law" and that the courts would
ensure "thatthe law would, in its particular operations, frustrate any attempts actually
made to govern illegally." Id. at 147.
81.

HAROLD J. BERMAN,

LAW AND

REVOLUTION,

II: THE IMPAcT OF THE

PROTESTANT REFORMATIONS ON THE WESTERN LEGAL TRADITION 261 (2003). See also
MIcHAEL LOBBAN, A HISTORY OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW IN THE COMMON LAW WORLD,
1600-1900 80 (2007) ("The king was bound by law in a number of ways. He could not
legislate alone; so that 'those actions of his which have not their formalities that the Law
requires are made void'.... [I]f the king exceeded his power, Hale argued, he would be
subject to the potestas irritans of the judges. This was their power simply to ignore his
actions where they were ultra vires.").
BERMAN, supra note 81, at 261.
82.
See id. In more modern terms, we might say that power-conferring rules
83.
provide the legal limitations on executive or legislative authority, even if there are no
sanctions directly imposed upon the executive or the legislators for violating these rules.
See Neil MacCormick, Does the United Kingdom Have a Constitution? Reflections on
MacCormick v. Lord Advocate, 29 N. IR. LEGAL Q. 1, 9 (1978). Or, alternatively, we might
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was bound by the directive power of the law and the invalidation of
"acts contrary to the requirements of the law."84 Of course, Hale was
writing prior to the shift of political power from 'the Crown to

Parliament,

but

the point

remains

consistent with

respect to

sovereignty itself.85
Conceived most broadly, the concept of sovereign power, or
potestas, extends to and embraces all powers of government. 86 But even
read expansively, the important point is that sovereignty was and
should be understood as "the absolute legal authority of the ruling
power in its corporate capacity." 8 7 Sovereignty denotes the authority to
govern and governance involves the exercise of power "through the
instrumentality of law" in the sense that law constitutes the
government's capacity and authority to govern and thereby defines the
legal content and validity of the actions taken by the government, so
constituted. 8 8 Parliament is sovereign in its legislative capacity, then,
in the sense that there are no coercive legal limitations on its ability to

legislate. 89 However, as Hart (like Hale) appreciated, in the operation
of the UK constitution through the UK rule of recognition, Parliament's
enactments are subject to the superseding power of the law in the sense
that the courts will not uphold them if they violate fundamental rule
of law and democratic principles, 90 and authoritative judicial

say that the voiding of the government's action is the sanction for the government's
failure to act within its legal authority. See THE CONCEPT OF LAW, supra note 26, at 31
("Legislation is an exercise of legal powers 'operative' or effective in creating legal rights
and duties. Failure to conform to the conditions of the enabling rule makes what is done
ineffective and so a nullity for this purpose.. . . The consequence of failure to conform to
such rules may not always be the same, but there will always be some rules, failure to
conform to which renders a purported exercise of legislative power a nullity or ... liable
to be declared invalid.").
84.

ON THE LAW OF NATURE, REASON, AND COMMON LAW, supra note 68, at 221.

85.
See generally Gary W. Cox, Was the Glorious Revolution a Constitutional
Watershed?, 72 J. ECON. HIST. 567, 568 (2012) (explaining the shift in power from the
Crown to Parliament following the Glorious Revolution of 1688).
86.
See, e.g., C.H. McIlwain, Sovereignty Again, 18 ECONOMICA 253, 253 (1926)
(expressing that sovereignty is "supreme", "single," and "undivided").
87.
Martin Loughlin, Why Sovereignty?, in SOVEREIGNTY AND THE LAW:
DOMESTIC, EUROPEAN, AND INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 43 (Richard Rawlings et al.

eds., 2013) (emphasis added).
88.
See id.
89.
See H.W.R. Wade, The Basis of Legal Sovereignty, 13 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 172,
174 (1955) [hereinafter The Basis of Legal Sovereignty] ("[T]here is one, and only one,
limit to Parliament's legal power: it cannot detract from its own continuing
sovereignty.").
90.
See CONCEPT OF LAw, supra note 26, at 69 ("A constitution which effectively
restricts the legislative powers of the supreme legislature in the system does not do so
by imposing (or at any rate need not impose) duties on the legislature not to attempt to
legislate in certain ways; instead it provides that any such purported legislation shall be
void.... Such restrictions on the legislative power ... may well be called constitutional
...
[T]hey vitally concern the courts, since they use such a rule as a criterion of the
validity of purported legislative enactments coming before them."). Cf. infra notes 13334.
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interpretations of legal norms bind the government by ensuring that

its actions are consistent with the existing understanding of the law.91
The authority of the courts to enforce constitutional principles and
preserve the rule of law depends explicitly or implicitly upon the
92
and correspondingly the
recognition of this authority by Parliament

sovereignty of Parliament to legislate without limitation depends upon
the recognition of this authority by the courts.93 In Dicey's view, there was
no irreconcilable tension in the UK constitution between parliamentary
sovereignty and the rule of law, 94 because judicial enforcement of
the functional
parliamentary legislation is what determines
95
of a rule
Thinking
to
legislate.
authority
of
Parliament's
realization

.

.

.

See R (Evans) v. Att'y Gen. [2015] UKSC 21, [52] (appeal taken from Wales)
91.
(Lord Neuberger, joined by Lords Kerr & Reed) ("[I]t is a basic principle that a decision
of a court is binding .. . and cannot be ignored or set aside by anyone, including (indeed
it may fairly be said, least of all) the executive."). An inchoate expression of the more
modern understanding that the legality of government acts depends upon their
recognition by the other organs of government can be found in Hale's own writings. See,
e.g., ON THE LAw OF NATURE, REASON, AND COMMON LAW, supra note 68, at 199, 200
("[T]he king without consent of the lords and commons in parliament ... cannot make a
binding law.. . . And as he cannot make a law without consent of parliament, so neither
can he repeal a law without the like consent."); id. at 227 ("[B]y the constitution of this
realm the supreme power of the king is limited and qualified that it cannot make a law
or impose a charge but by the consent both of lords and commons assembled in
parliament.... And yet this concurrence without the king's consent makes not a law.
.").
See DICEY, supra note 6, at 270 ('Parliament, though sovereign, ... has never
92.
hitherto been able to use the powers of the government as a means of interfering with
the regular course of law. . . . Parliament has tended as naturally to protect the
independence of judges. . ."); R (G) v. Immigration Appeal Tribunal [2004] EWCA (Civ)
1731, [12] (Eng.) (Lord Phillips) ("It is the role of the judges to preserve the rule of law.
The importance of that role has long been recognised by Parliament. It is a constitutional
norm recognised by statutory provisions that protect the independence of the judiciary
. .").
See TOM BINGHAM, THE RULE OF LAw 167 (2010) ("[T]he principle of
93.
parliamentary sovereignty has been recognized as fundamental in this country ..
because it has for centuries been accepted as such by judges and others officially
concerned in the operation of our constitutional system."); The Basis of Legal
Sovereignty, supra note 89, at 196 ("The seat of sovereign power is not to be discovered
by looking at Acts of any Parliament but by looking at the courts and discovering to
whom they give their obedience.").
See DICEY, supra note 6, at 268, 269 ("The sovereignty of Parliament and the
94.
supremacy of the law of the land . .. may appear to stand in opposition to each other, or
to be at best only counterbalancing forces. But this appearance is delusive; the
sovereignty of Parliament ... favours the supremacy of the law, whilst the predominance
of rigid legality throughout our institutions evokes the exercise, and thus increases the
authority, of Parliamentary sovereignty... . The principle that Parliament speaks only
through an Act of Parliament greatly increases the authority of the judges. A Bill which
has passed into a statute immediately becomes subject to judicial interpretation ... ").
See id. at 3-4 ("The principle of Parliamentary sovereignty means neither
95.
more nor less than this . .. the right to make or unmake any law whatever. . . . A law
may, for our present purpose, be defined as 'any rule which will be enforced by the
Courts.'"). See also Ahmed v. HM Treasury [2010] UKSC 2, [157] (appeal taken from
Eng.) ("Nobody should conclude that the result of these appeals constitutes judicial
interference with the will of Parliament. On the contrary it upholds the supremacy of
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of recognition as the institutional dynamics that define, through the
actions and beliefs of government officials, the meaning and force of
the British constitution, the interactions of judicial, legislative, and

executive organs of government are the operative meaning of the rule
of law in the British system. 9 6 And the courts sometimes refer to the
operation of these institutional dynamics in terms of a rule of
recognition. 97
This reciprocal institutional dynamic defines the meaning of
parliamentary sovereignty in the British constitutional system. If the
courts cannot alter the rule of recognition unilaterally, the same must
be true equally of Parliament. 98 This is the theory of constitutional
government that underlies the legal tradition of the common law, in
the United Kingdom"9 and, as Dicey saw it, in all of "those countries
which, like the United States of America, have inherited English

Parliament in deciding whether or not measures should be imposed that affect the
fundamental rights of those in this country."); R (Cart) v. Upper Tribunal [2009] EWHC
(Admin) 3052, [39] (Eng.) ("The rule of law requires that statute should be mediated by
an authoritative and independent judicial source; and Parliament's sovereignty itself
requires that it respect this rule.").
96.
See Philip A. Joseph, Parliament, the Courts, and the Collaborative
Enterprise, 15 KING'S C. L.J. 321, 322 (2004) ("Throughout English constitutional
history, Parliament and the courts have exercised co-ordinate, constitutive authority...
. Parliament and the political executive must look to the Courts for judicial recognition
of legislative power, and the Courts must look to Parliament and the political executive
for recognition of judicial independence."); see also NEIL MACCORMICK, QUESTIONING
SOVEREIGNTY: LAW, STATE, AND NATION IN THE EUROPEAN COMMONWEALTH 84-85
(1999); KEITH SYRETT, THE FOUNDATIONS OF PUBLIC LAW: PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS OF
POWER IN THE BRITISH CONSTITUTION 99-100 (2d ed. 2014); Nicholas Bamforth, Ultra
Vires and InstitutionalIndependence, in JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE CONSTITUTION 133-

35 (Christopher Forsyth ed., 2000).
97.
See, e.g., Pham v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't [2015] UKSC 19, [80]
(appeal taken from Eng.) (Lord Mance) ("For a domestic court, the starting point is, in
any event, to identify the ultimate legislative authority in its jurisdiction according to
the relevant rule of recognition. . . . [U]nless and until the rule of recognition by which
we shape our decisions is altered, we must view the United Kingdom as independent,
[and] Parliament as sovereign.... "); R (Jackson) v. Att'y Gen. [2005] EWCA (Civ) 126,
[90] (Eng. and Wales) ("What is in issue is a consensual constitutional change in the
manner in which sovereign power is exercised. The nature of that change depends not
simply on the words used in the legislation by which that change was brought about. It
depends on general recognition of the nature of the change, as demonstrated particularly
by those who brought about the change, but additionally by all affected by it. This is
what Hart described as the 'rule of recognition' in chapter six of his work on The Concept
of Law."). See also infra note 112.
98.
See Elias, supra note 25, at 5 ("The basic constitutional facts of the system
must be as true for the judges as they are for Parliament ... "). Goldsworthy seems on
occasion to concede this point. See CONTEMPORARY DEBATES, supra note 8, at 113, 116,
122.
99.
See Pierson [1998] AC at 587 ("Parliament does not legislate in a vacuum.
Parliament legislates for a European liberal democracy founded on the principles and
traditions of the common law."). Or in Hale's terms: "Lex non scripta ...
supplies the
matrix within which individual enactments of parliament are to be understood and
interpreted." ON THE LAW OF NATURE, REASON, AND COMMON LAW, supra note 68, at
xxxix. See also supra notes 68-72 and accompanying text.
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traditions." 10 0 And like Dicey, British judges have sometimes referred
to the shared constitutional DNA of common law systems around the
world:
All of the[se Commonwealth constitutions] were negotiated as well as drafted by
persons nurtured in the tradition of that branch of the common law of England
that is concerned with public law and familiar in particular with the basic
concept of separation of legislative, executive and judicial power as it had been
10 1
developed in the unwritten constitution of the United Kingdom.

The functional realization of the rule of law in a constitutional
system necessitates that each branch of government can act only in
accordance with the law, because the recognition of the legality and

legitimacy of each branch's action depends upon its explicit or implicit
endorsement by the other branches of government. 102 This is perhaps
most notable when a legal challenge is raised in court against an

100. DICEY, supranote 6, at 110. Of course, each common law nation that inherited
English traditions also inherited its own challenge of reconciling the judicial enforcement
of constitutional principles within a democratic system of government. See
CONTEMPORARY DEBATES, supra note 8, at 80.

101. Hinds v. The Queen [1977] AC 195, 212 (PC) (appeal taken from Jam.) (Lord'
Diplock). See also R v. Horseferry Rd. Magistrates' Court, ex parte Bennett [1994] 1 AC'
42, 67 (HL) (appeal taken from Scot.) ("Whatever differences there may be between the
legal systems of South Africa, the United States, New Zealand and this country, many'
of the basic principles to which they seek to give effect stem from common roots. There
is, I think, no principle more basic to any proper system of law than the maintenance of
the rule of law itself."); GEORGE ANASTAPLO, THE AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION:
A COMMENTARY 22-23 (1995) ("Underlying the rule of law in the United States is the
common law of England which was established on this continent in Colonial days. The
common law . . . is critical to the rule of law for the English-speaking peoples, reflecting
and reinforcing as it does a general constitutional system.").
102. See generally Re McFarland [2004] UKHL 17, [7] (appeal taken from N. Ir.)
("Just as the courts must apply Acts of Parliament whether they approve of them or not,
and give effect to lawful official decisions whether they agree with them or not, so
Parliament and the executive must respect judicial decisions, whether they approve of
them or not...."); R (Cart) v. Upper Tribunal [2011] UKSC 28, [21] (appeal taken from
Eng.) ("The satisfactory operation of the separation of powers requires that Parliament
should leave the judges free to perform their role of maintaining the rule of law but also
that, in performing that role, the judges should, so far as consistent with the rule of law,
have regard to legislative policy.") (quoting R (G) v. Immigration Appeal Tribunal [2004]
EWCA (Civ) 731, [20] (appeal taken from Eng.)). I recognize that the powers of British
government are not understood to be separated in the same manner as the powers of the
US government. Regardless of whether legislative and executive powers are fused in the
British system, however, the point being made here depends principally upon the
separation of judicial authority from the other branches. In addition, even if the
legislative and executive branches overlap more in the UK than they do in the US, their
respective functions are usually distinguishable. See Eric Barendt, Separationof Powers
and ConstitutionalGovernment, [1995] PUB. L. 599, 614-15.
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executive1 03 or administrative action, 104 but the point holds with

respect to legislative action, as well. 105 Furthermore, in certain notable
cases, senior members of the British judiciary have indicated that the
fundamental principles of the British constitution operate in a manner
"little different from those which exist in countries where the power of
the legislature is expressly limited by a constitutional document."1 06
The constitutional form in which these rights and principles are
expressed in different nations is less important than the substantive

103. The foundational expression of this principle is traced to Entick v. Carrington,
(1765) 19 STATE TRIALS 1029, 1065-66. For a more recent ruling to the same effect, see
Council of Civil Serv. Unions v. Minister for the Civil Serv. [1985] 1 AC 374, 409, 410
(the GCHQ case) (HL) (appeal taken from Eng.) (Lord Diplock) ("[I]n the absence of any
statute regulating the subject matter of the decision the source of the decision-making
power may still be the common law itself, i e that part of the common law that is given
by lawyers the label of 'the prerogative.' . . . I see no reason why simply because a
decision-making power is derived from a common law and not a statutory source, it
should for that reason only be immune from judicial review."). Id. at 417 (Lord Roskill)
("I am unable to see ... that there is any logical reason why the fact that the source of
the power is the prerogative and not statute should today deprive the citizen of that right
of challenge to the manner of its exercise which he would possess were the source of the
power statutory. In either case the act in question is the act of the executive."). See also
R (Rotherham Metro. Bor. Council) v. Sec'y of State for Bus., Innovation & Skills [2015]
UKSC 6, [61] (appeal taken from Eng.) ("The courts have no more constitutionally
important duty than to hold the executive to account by ensuring that it makes decisions
and takes actions in accordance with the law."); A v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't
(No. 2) [2005] UKHL 71, [22] (appeal taken from Eng.); A v. Sec'y of State for the Home
Dep't [2004] UKHL 56, [107]-[108] (appeal taken from Eng.); R v. Looseley [2001] UKHL
53, [40] (appeal taken from Eng.); Bennett [1994] 1 AC at 61-62 ("[T]he judiciary accept
a responsibility for the maintenance of the rule of law that embraces a willingness to
oversee executive action and to refuse to countenance behaviour that threatens either
basic human rights or the rule of law.").
104. See, e.g., Anisminic Ltd. v. Foreign Comp. Comm'n [1969] 2 AC 147, 214 (HL)
(appeal taken from Eng.); R (G) v. Immigration Appeal Tribunal [2004] EWCA (Civ)
1731, [13] (Eng.) ("The common law power of the judges to review the legality of
administrative action is a cornerstone of the rule of law in this country and one that the
judges guard jealously. If Parliament attempts by legislation to remove that power, the
rule of law is threatened.").
105. See, e.g., Jackson [2005] UKHL 56 at [107].
106. R v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, ex parte Simms [2000] 2 AC 115, 131
(HL) (appeal taken from Eng.) (Lord Hoffmann); see also R (Bancoult) v. Sec'y of State
for Foreign & Commonwealth Affairs [2007] EWCA (Civ) 498, [64] (Eng.) ("'Those
[prerogative legislative] powers, however, as in the case of all countries with written
constitutions, must be exercised in accordance with the terms of the constitution from
which the power derives. Exactly the same . . . is true of a country such as the United
Kingdom whose constitution, though unwritten, is no less real."). Cf. Sylvia Snowiss, The
Marbury of 1803 and the Modern Marbury, 20 CONST. CoMMENT. 231, 247 (2003)
("[S]ocieties with and without written constitutions and [US-style] judicial review, such
as the United States and Great Britain, can produce roughly the same results, namely
regimes of effective and limited government, civil liberties, and institutional stability...
. [F]or all of Marbury's stress on the written constitution, with its implicit contrast to the
unwritten English constitution ... a written constitution remains closer to an unwritten
constitution than to a statute."). I discuss below the related conceptions of constitutional
and judicial authority that underpin Marbury. See infra notes 151-63 and accompanying
text.
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content of these principles and their shared recognition throughout the
common law world. 107 Whether they originate in a charter document,
a legislative enactment, or a judicial decision, the fundamental
principles that legitimate and regulate government action and the
rights that individuals may claim as constitutionally protected derive
from common law concepts of procedural and substantive justice whose
10 8
expression is not limited to one institution or one nation.
Traditionally, an unwritten constitution may be amended by
"ordinary legislation," but some British judges have differentiated
between ordinary legislation and constitutional legislation or have
recognized that certain ordinary statutes possess substantive
characteristics that allow courts to regard them as "constitutional
statutes":

-

There are now classes or types of legislative provision which cannot be repealed
by mere implication. These instances are given, and can only be given, by our
own courts, to which the scope and nature of Parliamentary sovereignty are
ultimately confided... . [A] constitutional statute is one which (a) conditions the
legal relationship between citizen and State in some general, overarching
manner, or (b) enlarges or diminishes the scope of what we would now regard as
fundamental constitutional rights. . . . This development of the common law
regarding constitutional rights, and as I would say constitutional statutes, is
highly beneficial. It gives us most of the benefits of a written constitution, in
which fundamental rights are accorded special respect. But it preserves the
sovereignty of the legislature and the flexibility of our uncodified constitution. It
accepts the relation between legislative supremacy and fundamental rights is
not fixed or brittle: rather the courts . . . will pay more or less deference to the
109
legislature, or other public decision-maker, according to the subject in hand.

107. See generally R (Daly) v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't [2001] UKHL 26,
[30] (appeal taken from Eng. & Wales) (Lord Cooke) ("It is of great importance, in my
opinion, that the common law by itself is being recognised as a sufficient source of the
fundamental right to confidential communication with a legal adviser for the purpose of
obtaining legal advice. Thus the decision may prove to be in point in common law
jurisdictions not affected by the Convention. Rights similar to those in the Convention
are of course to be found in constitutional documents and other formal affirmations of
rights elsewhere. The truth is, I think, that some rights are inherent and fundamental
to democratic civilised society. Conventions, constitutions, bills of rights and the like
respond by recognising rather than creating them.") (emphasis added). See infra notes
141, 202, 225, 228.
108. In British constitutional law, this is frequently described as the principle of
legality. See, e.g., Pierson [1998] AC at 589 (Lord Steyn) ("[T]he principle of legality
served to protect procedural safeguards provided by the common law. But the principle
applies with equal force to protect substantive basic or fundamental rights. . . . A
corresponding principle applies in respect of basic standards and safeguards enshrined
in legislation. This proposition is hardly radical. Ultimately, common law and statute
law coalesce in one legal system.").
109. Thoburn v. Sunderland City Council [2003] QB 151, [60], [621, [64] (Eng.),
cited in HS2 Action All. [2014] UKSC 3 at [208]. Cf. R v. Lord Chancellor, ex parte
Lightfoot [2000] QB 597, 614 (Eng.) ("[C]onstitutional rights as I have sought to describe
them will generally be creatures of the common law. Statutes enacted by Parliament, by
virtue of Parliament's very sovereignty, possess equal force and status. All are capable
of repeal or amendment on the same basis. It is both an irony of our constitution, and a
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In the view of these judges, which seems to be shared implicitly by
Parliament as an institution, "the rule of law enforced by the courts is
the ultimate controlling factor on which our constitution is based."1 10
Properly understood, this judicial authority does not contradict or
countermand Parliament's legislative authority because statutory law
(constitutional or ordinary) secures the rights of individuals and
defines the powers of government through its interpretation and
application by the courts through their rulings. 1 1 And along with their
interpretation of existing legislation, the courts must sometimes
determine the nature of parliamentary action needed to alter
constitutional
rights
or
relationships. 11 2
The
common
law
constitutional tradition makimizes individual liberty and agency and
ensures the legitimacy of government action, in part by limiting the
power of government to interfere with the liberty and agency of
individuals. 11 3 In this constitutional tradition, the functional meaning

well-worn chestnut among legal theorists, that the all-powerful legislature lacks the
power to confer entrenched constitutional rights.").
110. Jackson [2005] UKHL 56 at [107]; see also R (Privacy Int'l) v. Investigatory
Powers Tribunal [2019] UKSC 22, [119] (appeal taken from Eng.) ("[T]he relationship
between Parliament and the courts is governed by accepted principles of the 'rule of law'.
Unsurprisingly, there is no challenge to the proposition . . . that there is 'no principle
more basic to our system of law than the maintenance of the rule of law itself and the
constitutional protection afforded by judicial review.' ") (quoting Cart [2011] UKSC 28 at
[122]); WILLIAM S. HOLDSWORTH, 6 A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 262-63 (3d ed. 1945).

111. See HS2 Action All. [2014] UKSC 3 at [79].
112. For a notable judicial reference to a "constitutional statute" that reinforces
the centrality of parliamentary legislation in the UK constitutional system, see R (Miller)
v. Sec'y of State for Exiting the European Union [2016] EWHC (Admin) 2768, [44] (Eng.)
(quoting Thoburn [2003] QB 151 at [62]). The Supreme Court of the United Kingdom
affirmed the High Court's judgment in Miller. See R (Miller) v. Sec'y of State for Exiting
the European Union [2017] UKSC 5, [67] (appeal taken from Eng.). The Supreme Court
ruled in Miller that the European Communities Act of 1972 (the 1972 Act) is legislation
of a "constitutional character" that cannot be abrogated unilaterally through the
prerogative powers of the executive or by implication. See id. at [79]-[82], [87], [108]. As
a result, the UK is subject to EU treaty provisions, including the Treaty on European
Union (2007), which describes the procedure under Article 50 by which a member state
may leave the EU. See id. at [25]-[26]. The Court ruled that the executive cannot
withdraw the UK from operative treaties without an authorizing act of Parliament and
the Article 50 procedure cannot be triggered by prerogative action that would alter
existing law in the absence of enabling primary legislation. See id. at [88], [122]. The
Court noted that parliamentary legislation was needed to effectuate the UK's accession
into the EU through which EU rights gained direct domestic effect in the UK. See id. at
[61]-[65]. And the Court indicated that corresponding parliamentary legislation would
be needed to effectuate the UK's exit from the EU and the concomitant extinguishment
of EU rights under UK law. See id. at [60] ("[I]n constitutional terms the effect of the
1972 Act was unprecedented. . . . Of course, consistently with the principle of
Parliamentary sovereignty, this unprecedented state of affairs will only last so long as
Parliament wishes: the 1972 Act can be repealed like any other statute. For that reason,
we would not accept that the so-called fundamental rule of recognition (ie the
fundamental rule by reference to which all other rules are validated) underlying UK laws
has been varied by the 1972 Act or would be varied by its repeal.").
113. See generally 8 HALSBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND ¶ 101 (4th ed. 2001)
("According to this traditional view of the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty, the
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of these rights is defined most often through claims raised in courts
and interpretations given by judges. 11 4 So the courts will often be the
institution through which these rights are enforced and government
actions are constrained, because without maintaining the courts'
ability to review the government's actions and enforce individuals'
rights, the nation's constitutional commitment to the rule of law would
be threatened.1 15
This commitment to the rule of law enforced by independent
courts is one of the cardinal values upon which the US and the UK
constitutions are based.1 16 Written or unwritten, entrenched or
unentrenched, the constitutions of the common law tradition exhibit a
particular conception of government, according to which fundamental
7
legal principles are enforced through the "ordinary"11 judicial process

to ensure that the people and the state are always governed by the
(same, common) law. Lord Brown (as he would become) summed up
this commitment to common law constitutionalism in this way:

liberties of the subject are merely implications drawn from two principles, namely: (1)T
that individuals may say or do what they please, provided they do not transgress the'
substantive law, or infringe the legal rights of others; and (2) that public authorities
(including the Crown) may do nothing but what they are authorised to do by some rule
of the common law (including the royal prerogative) or statute, and in particular they
may not interfere with the liberties of individuals without statutory authority.").
114. As Dicey recognized and emphasized. See DIcEY, supra note 6, at 273 ("The
fact that the most arbitrary powers of the English executive must always be exercised
under Act of Parliament places the government, even when armed with the widest
authority, under the supervision, so to speak, of the Courts. Powers, however
extraordinary, which are conferred or sanctioned by statute, are never really unlimited;
for they are confined by the words of the Act itself, and, what is more, by the
interpretation put upon the statute by the judges. . . . By every path we come round to
the same conclusion, that Parliamentary sovereignty has favoured the rule of law, and
that the supremacy of the law of the land both calls forth the exertion of Parliamentary
sovereignty, and leads to its being exercised in a spirit of legality.").
115. See generally Privacy Int'l [2019] UKSC 22 at [142] ("[F]ollowing the logic of
the reasoning in Cart, it may be thought implicit in the constitutional framework for the
rule of law . . . that legal issues of general importance should be reviewable by the
appellate courts ... "). As the Court suggested in Privacy International,the specific legal
mechanisms by which courts ensure the UK's constitutional commitment to preserve the
rule of law may vary, and may in appropriate situations be determined legislatively by
Parliament.
116. See generally MCCLELLAN, supra note 18.
117. Two of Dicey's senses of the rule of law refer specifically to "ordinary law"
enforced by "ordinary courts." See DICEY, supra note 6, at 110 ("[N]o man is punishable
or can be lawfully made to suffer in body or goods except for a distinct breach of law
established in the ordinary legal manner before the ordinary Courts of the land."); id. at
114 ("[E]very man, whatever be his rank or condition, is subject to the ordinary law of
the realm and amenable to the jurisdiction of the ordinary tribunals."). See also Begum
v. Tower Hamlets London Bor. Council [2003] UKHL 5, [35] (appeal taken from Eng.)
(Lord Hoffmann) ("[T]he English conception of the rule of law requires the legality of
virtually all governmental decisions affecting the individual to be subject to the scrutiny
of the ordinary courts."); Privacy Int'l [2019] UKSC 22 at [139] ("Consistent application
of the rule of law requires such an issue [decided by an administrative tribunal] to be
susceptible in appropriate cases to review by ordinary courts."). Cf. infra note 176 and
accompanying text.
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"Judicial review is the exercise of the court's inherent power at common
law to determine whether action is lawful or not; in a word to uphold

the rule of law." 1 18
This common law basis of British constitutionalism was explicitly
endorsed by Dicey as his third formulation of the rule of law: "the
general principles of the constitution . . . are with us the result of
judicial decisions determining the rights of private persons in
particular cases brought before the Courts." 119 In fact, Dicey's thinking

here shares a close affinity with Hale's and Hart's. 120 The meaning of
the British constitution identified by the UK rule of recognition is
determined by the actions and beliefs of government officials whose
actions are governed, and thereby legitimated, by their compliance
with British constitutional principles. 121 In the terms of Hartian
positivism, the most accurate understanding of the UK constitution
identified by the UK rule of recognition is "obscured by the simple
doctrine of sovereignty" insofar as "we must distinguish between a
legally unlimited legislative authority and one which, though limited,
is supreme in the system." 122 The correct understanding, as Dicey and

118. R v. Univ. of London, ex parte Vijayatunga [1988] 1 QB 322, 343. See also
Cart [2011] UKSC 28 at [37] ("[T]he scope of judicial review is an artefact of the common
law whose object is to maintain the rule of law ... "). For an expression of this principle
in US law, see St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States, 298 U.S. 38, 51-52 (1936)
(Hughes, C.J.) ("Legislative declaration or finding is necessarily subject to independent
judicial review upon the facts and the law by courts of competent jurisdiction to the end
that the Constitution as the supreme law of the land may be maintained. . .. Under our
system there is no warrant for the view that the judicial power of a competent court can
be circumscribed by any legislative arrangement designed to give effect to administrative
action going beyond the limits of constitutional authority."); see also id. at 84 (Brandeis,
J., concurring) ("The supremacy of law demands that there shall be opportunity to have
some court decide whether an erroneous rule of law was applied; and whether the
proceeding in which facts were adjudicated was conducted regularly. To that extent, the
person asserting a right, whatever its source, should be entitled to the independent
judgment of a court on the ultimate question of constitutionality.").
119. DIcEY, supra note 6, at 115; see also E. NEVILLE WILLIAMS, THE EIGHTEENTHCENTURY CONSTITUTION, 1688-1815: DOCUMENTS AND COMMENTARY 383-84 (1960);

HOLDSWORTH, supra note 110, at 263 ("Throughout the course of English history a large
part of our constitutional law has been made by judicial decisions; for our constitutional
law is simply a part of the common law.").
120. See THE CONCEPT OF LAW, supra note 26, at 152-53; COMMON LAW OF
ENGLAND, supra note 44, at 44. See also LOBBAN, supra note 81, at 87-89 ("Hale saw the
common law as a developing body.... The law grew both through the passing of new
legislation and through judicial interpretation. ... Judges thus had a role to play in the
development of the law, helping to accommodate it 'to the conditions, exigencies and
conveniencies of the people.' However, this was to be done by the reasoning of men
learned in the principles and precedents of law. For Hale, a body of experts interpreted
and developed a body of law which had originated in the past, by applying it to novel
circumstances in ways which would be most faithful to the spirit of that law.") (quoting
COMMON LAW OF ENGLAND, supra note 44, at 39).

121. See supra notes 26, 50 and accompanying text.
122. THE CONCEPT OF LAW, supra note 26, at 70-71. Cf. STEPHEN SEDLEY, ASHES
AND SPARKS: ESSAYS ON LAW AND JUSTIcE 129 (2011) ("Parliamentary sovereignty itself

is not a given but is part of a historic compromise by which the counterpart of the
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Hart saw, of the UK system of constitutional government would
recognize that Parliament is "the highest legislating authority .

.

. in

the sense that all other legislation may be repealed by [it], even though
12 3
Through the traditional
[its] own is restricted by a constitution."
judicial function, then, the courts ensure that the rule of law in Britain
is not something that British officials are solely working toward, it is
also something that they are always working from, because it is
24
something that they are never working without.1 In this way, Britain

realizes its commitment to the rule of law and, consistent with the
common law process of ensuring the legality of government action,
British judges are able to determine when certain actions of the
12 5
government are inconsistent with the British constitution.

The realization that Parliament derives its authority from the law
and cannot, therefore, abrogate the legal foundations of its own
authority has been as long recognized as it has been frequently
forgotten.12 6 In the early seventeenth century, for example, Thomas
Hedley noted that Parliament "derived its power from the legal system.
... Though parliament had unlimited powers of piecemeal legislation,

common law's deference to Parliament as the single legislative power has been
Parliament's recognition of the courts as the single adjudicative power. . . . [T]he
legislative and judicial arms of the state are each sovereign in their proper spheres...
.").
123. THE CONCEPT OF LAW, supra note 26, at 71; see also supra note 90.
124. See Cart [2009] EWHC (Admin) 3052 at [34], [36], [37] ("The court's ingrained
reluctance to countenance the statutory exclusion of judicial review has its genesis in the
fact that judicial review is a principal engine of the rule of law. . . . The sense of the rule
of law with which we are concerned rests in this principle, that statute law has to be.
mediated by an authoritative judicial source, independent both of the legislature which
made the statute, the executive government which (in the usual case) procured its
making, and the public body by which the statute is administered... . Only a court can
fulfil the role."). Cf. A.W. Bradley, Administrative Justice and Judicial Review: Taking
Tribunals Seriously?, [1992] PUB. L. 185, 189 ("[I]n the common law tradition, a public
authority may not enforce in a judicial forum a byelaw or regulation which, if judicially
scrutinized, would be held unlawful.").
125. See DICEY, supra note 6, at 121 ("The 'rule of law,' lastly, may be used as a
formula for expressing the fact that with us the law of the constitution . . . [is] not the
source but the consequence of the rights of individuals, as defined and enforced by the
Courts ... "); id. at 314 ('The second of these principles is what I have called the 'rule of
law,' or the supremacy throughout all our institutions of the ordinary law of the land.
This rule of law, which means at bottom the right of the Courts to punish any illegal act
by whomsoever committed, is of the very essence of English institutions. If the
sovereignty of Parliament gives the form, the supremacy of the law of the land
determines the substance of our constitution."). For a judicial expression of these
principles, see A v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't [2004] EWCA (Civ) 1123, [248]
(Eng.) ("[T]he law forbids the exercise of State power in an arbitrary, oppressive or
abusive manner. This is, simply, a cardinal principle of the rule of law. The rule of law
requires, not only that State power be exercised within the express limits of any relevant
statutory jurisdiction, but also fairly and reasonably and in good faith. Consequently the
courts will not entertain proceedings, or receive evidence in ongoing proceedings, if to do
so would lend aid or reward to the perpetration of any such wrongdoing by an agency of
the State.").
126. See The Basis of Legal Sovereignty, supra note 89.
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wholesale destruction of the law was quite impossible, 'for that were
includedly to take away the power of the parliament itself."1 27 In other
words, the fact that Parliament can alter rules of law, including rules
of constitutional law, does not mean that Parliament can eliminate the
legal rules that form the constitutional basis of its very authority to
legislate or can annihilate the constitutional framework within which
its existence as a legislature may be recognized.1 28 In Hart's terms,
these are the rules of change that empower the legislature to make and
alter the law through legislation.1 2 9 As Hart explained, legislative
authority is a legal authority that is itself predicated upon legal rules
(which are
often conceived as constitutional
provisions or
principles).1 3 0 Hart emphasized that this recognition of the legal
authority of the legislature to legislate is what contributes to and
constitutes "the existence of a legal system."131
So if we imagine Parliament legislating in a manner that would
controvert its own authority to legislate in accordance with the law, we
would have to imagine Parliament legislating away the constitutional
system in which it exists as a legislature. Hart saw, as Hedley and Hale
did long before him, that this amounts to a constitutional
contradiction.1 3 2 Here, again, we find the dynamic element of the

127.

ALAN CROMARTIE, THE CONSTITUTIONALIST REVOLUTION: AN ESSAY ON THE

HISTORY OF ENGLAND, 1450-1642 204 (2006); (quoting Thomas Hedley, Speech in the
House of Commons (June 28, 1610) in 2 PROCEEDINGS IN PARLIAMENT 1610 173-74
(Elizabeth Read Foster ed., 1966)).
128. For an explanation of the distinction I have in mind here, see HANS KELSEN,
INTRODUCTION TO THE PROBLEMS OF LEGAL THEORY 56-59 (1992) (discussing the
creation and alteration of the basic norm of a legal system); id. at 72-73 (discussing the
creation and invalidation of legal norms within a legal system). The Supreme Court of
the United Kingdom has discerned this distinction. See Miller [2017] UKSC 5 at [78]
("There is a vital difference between changes in domestic law resulting from variations
in the content of EU law arising from new EU legislation, and changes in domestic law
resulting from withdrawal by the United Kingdom from the European Union. The former
involves changes in EU law, which are then brought into domestic law through section
2 of the 1972 Act. The latter involves a unilateral action by the relevant constitutional
bodies which effects a fundamental change in the constitutional arrangements of the
United Kingdom.").
129. See THE CONCEPT OF LAW, supra note 26, at 95-96.
130. See id. at 59, 61 ("The statement that a new legislator has a right to legislate
presupposes the existence, in the social group, of the rule under which he has this right.
... The officials of the system may be said to acknowledge explicitly such fundamental
rules conferring legislative authority: the legislators do this when they make laws in
accordancewith the rules which empower them to do so. . .") (emphasis added).
131. Id. at 61 (emphasis added).
132. See supra notes 65, 80-84, 127 and accompanying text. Cf. Charge to Grand
Jury-Treason, 30 F. Cas. 1039, 1041 (D. Mass. 1861) (Sprague, J.) ("[I]t is vain to contend
for a constitutional right to overthrow the constitution, and a legal right to destroy all
law."). See also JOHN E. ATWELL, ENDS AND PRINCIPLES IN KANT'S MORAL THOUGHT 178

(1986) (explaining that a claim of "a constitutionally-authorized right ... to overthrow
the constitution" amounts to a claim of "a right to destroy that which makes it a right"
and is "therefore self-contradictory."). Although Sprague and Atwell discuss this point in
relation to armed revolts, the point holds with respect to Kelsenian revolutions, as well.
See HANS KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE 118-19 (1945).
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functional UK constitution identified by the UK rule of recognition.
The meaning of Parliament's hypothetical legislation, which would

ostensibly nullify the constitutional and democratic foundations of the

13 3
UK legal system, cannot be determined by Parliament alone.
The rule of law is just as much a part of the rule of recognition in
the United Kingdom as parliamentary sovereignty. And a defining
feature of common law constitutionalism is the identification of laws
with regard to their consistency with the fundamental principles
according to which the laws are made, and the substantive rights that
those principles describe. According to this tradition, when acts of the
government threaten the fundamental values of the constitutional
system, the common law courts have an independent authority to
determine the legality of government action and thereby ensure that
134
In the United Kingdom, and in every
the rule of law is maintained.
law tradition, the courts'
common
the
inherited
nation that
rights and enforcing
individual
defining
involves
function
institutional
principled constraints on state power that help to construct the
meaning of their nation's constitution over time. It is precisely in this

sense, as Hale, Dicey, and Hart all understood, that the common law
functions as the fundamental legal framework of government in the

United Kingdom.

III. THE MARBURY SYLLOGISMS AND THE CODIFIED CONSTITUTION

For many sovereignty theorists, the exercise of judicial review
under the US Constitution is a cautionary tale. Echoing Goldsworthy's
135
the concerns about
concerns about common law constitutionalism,

133. See Moohan v. Lord Advocate [2014] UKSC 67, [35] (appeal taken from Scot.)
("[I]n the very unlikely event that a parliamentary majority abusively sought to entrench
its power by a curtailment of the franchise or similar device, the common law, informed
by principles of democracy and the rule of law ... would be able to declare such legislation
unlawful."). Cf. The Basis of Legal Sovereignty, supra note 89, at 189. ("[T]he 'ultimate
legal principle' . .. lies in the keeping of the courts, and no Act of Parliament can take it
away from them. This is only another way of saying that it is always for the courts, in
the last resort, to say what is a valid Act of Parliament ... ").
134. See Jackson [2005] UKHL 56 at [107] (Lord Hope) ("[T]he courts shall
disregard as unauthorised and void the acts of any organ of government, whether
legislative or administrative, which exceed the limits of the power that organ derives
from the law."); id. at [159] (Baroness Hale) ("The courts will treat with particular
suspicion (and might even reject) any attempt to subvert the rule of law by removing
governmental action affecting the rights of the individual from all judicial scrutiny.").
See also Ahmed [2010] UKSC 2 at [146] ("Access to a court to protect one's rights is the
foundation of the rule of law."); Begum [2003] UKHL 5 at [27] ("If an administrator is
regarded as being an independent and impartial tribunal on the ground that he is
enlightened, impartial and has no personal interest in the matter, it follows there need
not be any possibility of judicial review of his decision. He is above the law. That is a
position contrary to basic English constitutional principles.").
135. See supra note 34.
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US-style judicial review include the politicization of judicial selection
and judicial decision making, and the judicialization of issues that are
better resolved through the political process. The. combined effect of

these trends is a loss of faith in the courts and in the political process.
Needless to say, there are genuine empirical, historical, and political
rejoinders to these criticisms, as well. For purposes of this Article,
however, I will prescind from these debates. My focus here is on the
assumption that the existence of US-style judicial review depends
upon the existence of the written US Constitution.
Many UK constitutional lawyers and theorists, and others, 136 view
US-style judicial review 137 as a consequence of the written US
Constitution. For these lawyers and scholars, avoiding this expansive
exercise of judicial authority, and the attendant political conflict it
engenders, are reasons in themselves for the United Kingdom not to
codify its constitution. 13 8 And some argue further that, in the absence
of a written constitution on which courts could rely, avoiding these
conflicts is a "pragmatic" reason that UK courts recognize the
sovereignty of Parliament as a constitutional doctrine. 139
One problem with this view is that it rests upon a
misapprehension of the constitutional basis for judicial review in the

136. See, e.g., Stephen L. Carter, Constitutional Improprieties: Reflections on
Mistretta, Morrison, and Administrative Government, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 357, 375 n.57
(1990) ("[I]f the ...
chosen method [of judicial review] is not tied closely to the text,
structure, and history of the Constitution, then far from being the 'right kind' of judicial
review, it is not judicial review at all."); Stephen A. Siegel, The Federal Government's
Power to Enact Color-ConsciousLaws: An Originalist Inquiry, 92 Nw. U. L. REV. 477,
542-43 (1998) ("[T]he Constitution authorizes judicial review only for government
activity conflicting with the written text.").
137. For the balance of this section, when I refer to judicial review I am referring
to the judicial authority to void unconstitutional primary legislation or government
action.
138.

See KEVIN HARRISON & TONY BOYD, THE CHANGING CONSTITUTION 88 (2006)

(quoting Lord Falconer) ("If we had a written constitution it would be open to judges'
interpretation and lead to a clash between judges and politicians."); Dawn Oliver,
Parliament and the Courts: A Pragmatic (or Principled)Defence of the Sovereignty of
Parliament,in PARLIAMENT AND THE LAw 322 (Alexander Horne & Gavin Drewry eds.)

(2d ed. 2018) ("[T]he UK is unlikely to adopt a written Constitution which grants the
Supreme Court the right to review provisions in Acts for constitutionality. . . . [The]
doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty works relatively well and broadly in the public
interest because the doctrine is a typically British pragmatic way of avoiding damaging
conflict between the courts and our political bodies. . . . The doctrine works largely
because other arrangements are in place to constrain government, but not by law: law is
not everything.... [I]n the absence of an entrenched written constitution establishing a
constitutional court with constitutional review powers, parliamentary sovereignty ...
can avoid the negative unintended consequences of judicial review that have been
experienced in other countries ... ").
139. See Oliver, supranote 138, at 321 ("I have suggested that there is a pragmatic
rationale for the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty in the UK: given the absence of
a formal written constitution which enjoys public support and legitimacy, the courts
know that a challenge by them to the legal validity of a provision in an Act of Parliament
may itself by challenged and disobeyed by government, that in such a conflict the courts
could well find themselves unable to enforce their orders. . .").
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United States and then transposes that misunderstanding onto the UK
constitutional system. Dawn Oliver provides a characteristic
expression of the underlying assumptions:
In the USA, for instance, the Supreme Court may strike down legislation that is
incompatible with the Constitution (Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137
(1803)) .... A difference between almost all other countries and the UK . .. is
that the UK does not have a written Constitution in the sense of an authoritative
text against which a bill can be measured for compatibility with the
Constitution. 140

This section closely examines the reasoning of Marbury as a way
of responding to Professor Oliver's reading of the case, and then will
reconsider Oliver's claims about the UK system in light of this analysis

of Marbury.
There are a number of interrelated historical and conceptual
problems with the assumption that a written constitution is a
prerequisite for the exercise of judicial review: (1) it assumes that the
rights courts can enforce are differently (and more securely) protected
1 41
(2) it creates the
if they are written in a charter document;
impression that courts cannot enforce rights unless they are written in
a charter document; 14 2 (3) it proceeds from the misconception that
judicial review in the United States developed only after or in reference
14 3
and (4) it overlooks the fact that "the
to a written charter document;

140.

DAWN OLIVER,

CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM IN THE UNITED KINGDOM

198

in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 166 (David Dyzenhaus

&

(2003). Cf. Richard Stacey, PopularSovereignty and Revolutionary Constitution-Making,
Malcolm Thorburn eds., 2016) ("[W]here the constitution empowers a court to strike
down ordinary laws for reasons of their inconsistency with the organizational laws set
out in the constitution, all the court does is ensure that the representative government's
discharge of its electoral mandate . .. remains within the regulative limits set during the
period of constitutional lawmaking. Whether a court is entitled to interpret the
constitution in this way is contingenton the terms of each constitutional document. Some
constitutions may not give the courts this power, but where they do, it is the people
themselves, in the exercise of popular sovereignty at a constitutional moment, that
establish the power of judicial review.") (emphasis added).
141. See T.R.S. ALLAN, LAW, LIBERTY, AND JUSTICE: THE LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF
BRITISH CONSTITUTIONALISM 143 (1993) ("[T]he common law is often considered inferior

to bills or charters of rights as a vehicle for protecting fundamental liberties. It is
mistakenly thought that restatement of individual rights in a constitutional document
could transform their strength, when they have to be asserted in opposition to
countervailing public interests."); see also W.J. WALUCHOW, A COMMON LAW THEORY OF
JUDICIAL REVIEW: THE LIVING TREE 47-48 (2007).

142. See Thomas C. Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN. L.
REV. 703, 716 (1975) ("As it came to be accepted that the judiciary had the power to
enforce the commands of the written Constitution when these conflicted with ordinary
law, it was also widely assumed that judges would enforce as constitutional restraints
the unwritten . . . rights as well. The practice of the Marshall Court and of many of its
contemporary state courts, and the writings of the leading constitutional commentators
through the first generation of our national life, confirm this understanding.").
143.

See WILLIAM E. NELSON, MARBURY V. MADISON: THE ORIGINS AND LEGACY OF

JUDICIAL REVIEW 35-44,50-62,64-67 (2d ed. 2018); A. E. DICK HOWARD, THE ROAD FROM

108

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OFTRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VOL. 53:79

United States Supreme Court . . . does not derive its power to declare
Acts of Congress to be unconstitutional from the US Constitution."14 4

While the first three of these problems should be kept in mind during
the discussion that follows, The focus here is primarily on the fourth.
Although it is easy to lose sight of, the reason that the courts of
the United States do not derive their power to declare congressional
acts unconstitutional from the US Constitution, and the reason that
John Marshall in Marbury did not base the courts' authority to exercise
judicial review on the written Constitution, is that the power of judicial
review is not mentioned in the written US Constitution.1 45
Fundamental as this point is, it continues to elude those who believe
judicial review must be grounded on the existence of a written
constitution that empowers courts to exercise that authority. To be
clear, I am not arguing against the historical and political salience of
the fact that the US Constitution was written. 146 I am not arguing that
the framers of the US Constitution did not contemplate the courts'
exercise of this authority,147 nor am I arguing that the basis for this
authority does not exist in the structural framework and interrelated
clauses of the document. 148 I am arguing that judicial review in the
United States does not depend, logically or legally, upon the existence
of a written constitution; and conversely the absence of a written

RUNNYMEDE: MAGNA CARTA AND CoNSTITUTIoNALISM IN AMERICA 280 (1968); Edward S.

Corwin, The Establishmentof JudicialReview, 9 MICH. L. REV. 102, 105-20 (1910).
144. BRICE DICKSON, Comparing Supreme Courts, in JUDICIAL ACTIVISM IN
COMMON LAw SUPREME COURTS 6 (Brice Dickson ed., 2007).
145. See NEAL DEVINS & LOUIS FISHER, THE DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION 12 (2d

ed. 2015) ("The text does not expressly confer upon the Supreme Court the power to
declare unconstitutional an act of Congress, the President, or state government.").
146. See Nikolas Bowie, Why the Constitution Was Written Down, 71 STAN. L. REV.
1397, 1400-01, 1496-1504 (2019).
147. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 403 (Alexander Hamilton) (George W.
Carey & James McClellan eds., 2001) ("By a limited constitution I understand one which
contains certain specified exceptions to the legislative authority.. . . Limitations of this
kind can be preserved in practice no other way than through the medium of the courts
of justice; whose duty it must be to declare all acts contrary to the manifest tenor of the
constitution void."); James Wilson, Debates of the Pennsylvania Convention (Dec. 1,
1787), in 2 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION:
RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION BY THE STATES, PENNSYLVANIA 450-51 (Merrill
Jensen ed., 1976) ("I had occasion, on a former day, . . . to state that the power of the

Constitution was paramount to the power of the legislature, acting under that
Constitution. For it is possible that the legislature, when acting in that capacity, may
transgress the bounds assigned to it, and an act may pass, in the usual mode,
notwithstanding that transgression; but when it comes to be discussed before the judges
- when they consider its principles and find it to be incompatible with the superior power
of the Constitution, it is their duty to pronounce it void."). See also Thomas W. Merrill,
The Common Law Powers of Federal Courts, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 61-62, 64-65 (1985);
Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Article III's Case/ControversyDistinctionand the DualFunctions
of Federal Courts, 69 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 447, 492 (1994).
148. See Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of ConstitutionalLaw, 73
HARV. L. REV. 1, 3-7 (1959).

20201

THE CONSTITUTIONAL LOGIC OF THE COMMON LAW

109

constitution in the United Kingdom does not preclude the exercise of
this authority by British courts.
Marshall did, in Marbury, discuss judicial review in relation to the
distinctive nature of a written constitution. 149 But he does not ground
the authority of the written constitution and the authority of the
courts' power to interpret and apply that constitution on the same legal
or conceptual footing.' 50 The authority of the Constitution as
fundamental law and the authority of the courts as expositors of the
constitution's meaning are closely related but not coextensive.
Confusion about this distinction has led to confusion about the
historical and theoretical basis for judicial review in a common law
system with a written constitution.
Analyzing Marshall's reasoning in Marbury can help to

differentiate

the bases of constitutional

and judicial authority

discussed in the case.151 To focus on the specific elements of Marshall's
52
reasoning, here are the central arguments in the form of syllogisms1
that define the respective authority of the written Constitution and of
53
the courts in exercising judicial review.1

149. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803).
150. See id. ("The constitution is either a superior, paramount law, unchangeable
by ordinary means, or it is on a level with ordinary legislative acts, and like other acts,
is alterable when the legislature shall please to alter it. If the former part of the
alternative be true, then a legislative act contrary to the constitution is not law: if the
latter part be true, then written constitutions are absurd attempts, on the part of the
people, to limit a power, in its own nature illimitable. Certainly all those who have
framed written constitutions contemplate them as forming the fundamental and
paramount law of the nation, and consequently the theory of every such government
must be, that an act of the legislature, repugnant to the constitution, is void.").
151. I describe Marshall's reasoning in the form of syllogisms. There is an
extensive literature on the use of syllogistic reasoning in the common law tradition of
judicial decision making. See, e.g., JOHN GARDNER, LAW AS A LEAP OF FAITH: ESSAYS ON
LAW IN GENERAL 76-79 (2012); NEIL MACCORMICK, LEGAL REASONING AND LEGAL
THEORY 41-50 (1978); NEIL MACCORMICK, RHEToRIC AND THE RULE OF LAW: A THEORY
OF JUDICIAL REASONING 32-37, 44-47 (2005); ANDREI MARMOR, THE LANGUAGE OF LAW

79-83 (2014).
152. For ease and clarity of expression, the syllogisms as presented in the text are
enthymematic. There is some historical basis to believe that Marshall might deliberately
have been reasoning and writing in syllogistic form when constructing his Marbury
opinion. See Stephen B. Presser, Samuel Chase: In Defense of the Rule of Law and
Against the Jeffersonians, 62 VAND. L. REV. 349, 361 (2009) (describing the presentation
of the "Virginia Syllogism" at the trial of James Callender, noting that Marshall was
present in court for the argument, and explaining that he used "similar language" in
Marbury).
153. Edward White also analyzes Marshall's reasoning in Marbury as a syllogism.
See G. Edward White, The ConstitutionalJourney of Marbury v. Madison, 89 VA. L. REV.
1463, 1477-83 (2003). Briefly summarized, Professor White construes the syllogism in
five steps: (1) The Constitution is the fundamental and paramount law of the nation; (2)
the Constitution was written to define and limit government powers and to allow
Americans to refer to these limits when they believe the government has exceeded its
constitutional powers; (3) legislative acts that violate the Constitution do not bind the
people or the courts; (4) the judicial power under the Constitution includes the power to
determine whether legislation contravenes the Constitution; and (5) the judiciary is
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A. The Constitutional Syllogism
The Constitution is the supreme law of the land. 154
Any law of the United States that conflicts with the Constitution is
void.155
Section 13 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 conflicts with Article III of the
Constitution.1 56
--- Section 13 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 is void.157

B. The JudicialSyllogism
The courts have the authority to say what the law is. 1 58
The Constitution is law.1 59
--- The courts have the authority to say what the Constitution is.160

.

superior to other governmental interpreters of the Constitution because the judiciary is
nonpartisan. See id. As I will explain, my analysis of Marshall's reasoning differs from
White's. I cannot address all of the points on which we diverge here. But I will mention
two particular concerns that touch on the central themes of this article. First, White
elides Marshall's arguments regarding the authority of the Constitution and the
authority of the judiciary. See id. Although these are related, the legal and conceptual
bases for constitutional and judicial authority are discrete and independent in Marbury.
Second, White claims that the reasoning in Marbury commits Marshall to a defense of
judicial supremacy that is not necessarily present, explicitly or by implication, in the
opinion itself. See The Rule of Recognition and the Rule of Law, supra note 23, at 38486.
154. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 ('This Constitution ... shall be the supreme Law
of the Land....").
155. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803) ("[A]n act of the legislature,
repugnant to the constitution, is void.").
156. See id. at 175-76 ("To enable this court then to issue a mandamus, it must be
shown to be an exercise of appellate jurisdiction, or to be necessary to enable them to
exercise appellate jurisdiction. It has been stated at the bar that the appellate
jurisdiction may be exercised in a variety of forms, and that if it be the will of the
legislature that a mandamus should be used for that purpose, that will must be obeyed.
This is true, yet the jurisdiction must be appellate, not original. It is the essential
criterion of appellate jurisdiction, that it revises and corrects the proceedings in a cause
already instituted, and does not create that cause. Although, therefore, a mandamus
may be directed to courts, yet to issue such a writ to an officer for the delivery of a paper,
is in effect the same as to sustain an original action for that paper, and therefore seems
not to belong to appellate, but to original jurisdiction ... ").
157. See id. at 179-80 ("The authority, therefore, given to the supreme court, by
the act establishing the judicial courts of the United States, to issue writs of mandamus
to public officers, appears not to be warranted by the constitution. ... [T]he framers of
the constitution contemplated that instrument, as a rule for the government of courts.
.").
158. See id. at 177 ("It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial
department to say what the law is.").
159. See id. at 177 ("[A]ll those who have framed written constitutions contemplate
them as forming the fundamental and paramount law of the nation ... ").
160. See id. at 178-79 ("[T]he constitution is to be considered, in court, as a
paramount law. . . . In some cases then, the constitution must be looked into by the
judges.").
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Doctrinally and conceptually, to understand the different bases for
the authority of the Constitution and the authority of the courts, we
should focus on the major premises of each syllogism. The authority for
the statement that the Constitution is the supreme law of the land is

the text of the Supremacy Clause. Indeed, where Marshall uses that
precise phrase from Article VI-"the supreme law of the land"-he
refers explicitly to the Constitution.161 However, where Marshall
discusses the authority of the courts to interpret and apply the law"to say what the law is"-including the Constitution as a source of law,
he refers generally to the province and duty of the judicial
department. 6 2 Reading the judicial syllogism together with the
constitutional syllogism, then, the courts have the power to say that
Section 13 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 conflicts with the Constitution

and is void (and, prospectively, the power to say when any law conflicts
63
with the Constitution and is void).1

The differentiated legal bases for the authority of each respective
major premise helps to explain the mistake of conflating the discrete
foundations of constitutional and judicial authority discussed in
Marbury. The basis for the Constitution's authority derives from the
written Constitution itself. The Supremacy Clause was a textual effort

(among others) to avoid the widely perceived problems with the
Articles of Confederation in establishing an autonomous and self64
That is the purpose of the
sustaining national government.1
Supremacy Clause and its perhaps self-evident (to Marshall, at least)
65
The written
assertion of the authority of a written constitution.1

Constitution is supreme law because that is the purpose of writing a
constitution, the purpose in particular of defining and limiting the

161. See id. at 180 ("[I]n declaring what shall be the supreme law of the land, the
constitution itself is first mentioned. . . . Thus, the particular phraseology of the
constitution of the United States confirms and strengthens the principle ... that a law
repugnant to the constitution is void.").
162. See supra note 158.
163. See Marbury, 5 U.S. at 177-78 ("If two laws conflict with each other, the
courts must decide on the operation of each. So if a law be in opposition to the
constitution; if both the law and the constitution apply to a particular case, so that the
court must either decide that case conformably to the law, disregarding the constitution;
or conformably to the constitution, disregarding the law; the court must determine which
of these conflicting rules governs the case. This is of the very essence of judicial duty.").
164.

See

ALISON

L.

LACROIX,

THE

IDEOLOGICAL

ORIGINS

OF AMERICAN

FEDERALISM 161-62 (2010) (explaining the role of the Supremacy Clause in realizing
Madison's goal-although not by Madison's preferred means of a federal legislative
negative-of providing the federal government with the authority to invalidate actions
of states that violate the US Constitution or federal laws); Jack N. Rakove, The Origins
of Judicial Review: A Plea for New Contexts, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1031, 1042-47 (1997).
165. This was self-evident to Hamilton and Madison, as well. See THE FEDERALIST
No. 33, at 161 (Alexander Hamilton) (George W. Carey & James McClellan eds., 2001)
("[T]he clause which declares the supremacy of the laws of the union ... only declares a
truth, which flows immediately and necessarily from the institution of a federal
government."); THE FEDERALIST No. 44 (James Madison).
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powers of the legislature in a democratic system. 166 In the US federal
system of separated powers, this would famously involve empowering
the federal government to constrain possible excesses of the states,1 67
and then, in turn, enabling the respective branches of the federal
government to restrain one another. 168
This is an appropriate moment to address an abiding criticism of
Marshall's Marbury opinion. Many scholars have pointed out over the
years that Marshall expresses the major premise of the constitutional
syllogism as encompassing the intrinsic supremacy of all written
constitutions.1 69 His opinion does read that way in several passages
and taken so broadly the claim is appreciably false. After all, in many
nations with written constitutions there is no means (and surely no
judicial one) of invalidating a statute that conflicts with the
constitution.1 70 So it is fair enough to note that Marshall incautiously

166. See Marbury, 5 U.S. at 176-77 ("The powers of the legislature are defined,
and limited; and that those limits may not be mistaken, or forgotten, the constitution is
written.... The distinction, between a government with limited and unlimited powers,
is abolished, if those limits do not confine the persons on whom they are imposed, and if
acts prohibited and acts allowed, are of equal obligation. It is a proposition too plain to
be contested, that the constitution controls any legislative act repugnant to it . . ."). Cf.
VERNON BOGDANOR, THE NEW BRITISH CONSTITUTION 13 (2009) ("Partof the purpose of

such a [codified] constitution is to limit the power of the legislature.... In countries with
enacted constitutions, it is normally not Parliament, the legislature, which is supreme,
but the constitution.").
167. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 44 (James Madison).
168. See THE FEDERALIST NOS. 47, 48 at 249, 256 (James Madison) (George W.
Carey & James McClellan eds., 2001) ("The accumulation of all powers, legislative,
executive, and judiciary, in the same hands . . . may justly be pronounced the very
definition of tyranny. . . . [U]nless these departments be so far connected and blended,
as to give to each a constitutional control over the others, the degree of separation which
the maxim requires, as essential to a free government, can never in practice be duly
maintained.").
169. See, e.g., William W. Van Alstyne, A Critical Guide to Marbury v. Madison,
DUKE L.J. 1, 17-18 (1969).
170. Although I will not take too much space to pursue the point here, Van
Alstyne's assertions have problems of their own. For example, he states that "even in
Marshall's time . .. a number of nations maintained written constitutions and yet gave
national legislative acts the full force of positive law without providing any constitutional
check to guarantee the compatibility of those acts with their constitutions." Id. at 17. As
support for this claim, Van Alstyne cites "France, Switzerland, and Belgium ... " Id. at
n.29. Limiting Van Alstyne's assertion "in Marshall's time" to when he wrote Marbury
in (or around) 1803, his claim is difficult to support. For instance, the French constitution
of 1799 (and later incarnations) allowed for "the possibility of constitutional control of
legislation." See MAURO CAPPELLETTI, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD
33 (1971). As Cappelletti goes on to explain, constitutional control of legislation in the
French tradition was not a judicial authority, and it was arguably "theoretical" for much
of French history, but Van Alstyne's reference to France must, at least, be qualified. See
id. at 33-34. Belgium enacted its national constitution in 1831. See NORMAN DORSEN,
MICHEL
ROSENFELD,
ANDRAS
SAJ6
&
SUSANNE
BAER,
COMPARATIVE
CONSTITUTIONALISM: CASES AND MATERIALS 380-81 (2003). And the first Swiss national
constitution appeared in 1848. See WAYNE NORMAN, NEGOTIATING NATIONALISM:
NATION-BUILDING, FEDERALISM, AND SECESSION IN THE MULTINATIONAL STATE 82

(2006). Whatever else Van Alstyne may find to criticize in Marbury, it seems excessive
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considered his argument in Marbury to derive from or to apply to all
written constitutions in all legal systems. But it is also worth
171
) a critical sentence of the opinion
examining carefully (or charitably
with respect to this criticism: "This theory [of constitutional
supremacy] is essentially attached to a written constitution, and is

consequently to be considered, by this court, as one of the fundamental
principles of our society." 172 So Marshall's more specific argument may
be interpreted as a claim not about all written constitutions, but
instead as a claim about the written US Constitution, which the
italicized terms suggest is reasonable, and this argument gains more
traction. The closing passage of the opinion reinforces this reading:

[I]n declaring what shall be the supreme law of the land, the constitution itself
is first mentioned; and not the laws of the United States generally, but those only
which shall be made in pursuance of the constitution, have that rank. Thus, the
particularphraseology of the constitution of the United States confirms and
strengthens the principle, supposed to be essential to all written constitutions,
173
-that a law repugnant to the constitution is void.
Taken in its entirety, then, Marshall's specific claim in Marbury
about the supremacy of the Constitution coheres with the text,
contemporaneous writings, and political history. On that basis, it

seems more plausible for Marshall to contend that, in the US system,
a law that conflicts with the Constitution is considered void. This is

why the premises of the constitutional syllogism are phrased as they
are, because Marshall did not need to make a claim about all
constitutions everywhere, and in several important passages of his
opinion he did not do so. His opinion in Marbury was written to
describe the legal result when a US law conflicts with the

to fault Marshall for failing to account for written constitutions that would not come into
existence for another twenty-eight and forty-five years, respectively. See Van Alstyne,
supra note 169, at 17-18. In addition., of course, all of these are civil law nations in which
the judicial systems were not historically designed or understood to allow a court to make
binding judgments regarding the constitutionality of legislation. See Mauro Cappelletti,
JUDICIAL REVIEW IN THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD 60-61 (1971).

171. Attacking Marbury has become a bit of a parlor game for some US academics
over the years. Of course, the opinion must stand on its own merits, like any other
example of legal reasoning and judicial decision making. My point here is just that fairly
understanding Marshall's judgment means attributing to him the best argument his
writing

and

reasoning

will

sustain.

See

DONALD

DAVIDSON,

SUBJECTIVE,

INTERSUBJECTIVE, OBJECTIVE 211 (2001) ("The Principle of Coherence prompts the
interpreter to discover a degree of logical consistency in the thought of the speaker ... ").
On Davidson's account, the principle of coherence is a form or element of the principle of
charity inherent in a responsible interpretive effort to understand another's expressions.
See id. at 147-50. For a defense of Marshall's opinion against many of the broadsides
advanced against it, see Louise Weinberg, Our Marbury, 89 VA. L. REV. 1235 (2003). For
Weinberg's discussion of judicial review, see id. at 1395-1407.
172. Marbury, 5 U.S. at 177 (emphasis added).
173. Id. at 180 (emphasis added).
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Constitution. 174 Of course, this still does not mean that courts were
empowered to make that determination. Perhaps Marshall's
recognition of the distinction between the authority of the Constitution
and the authority of the courts is why he grounded this judicial

authority on a different legal and conceptual basis in Marbury.
The basis of the courts' authority to exercise judicial review does
not derive from the written Constitution. 175 It originates in the
inherent authority of common law courts: "Marbury'sjustification of
judicial review, grounded as it is in the 'ordinary and humble judicial
duty' of the common law courts, seems necessarily to entail a general
obligation of independent law-exposition by article III courts. This is
what courts 'do'; it is their 'job."'1 76
The courts say what the law is because they are courts, and that
is what courts do. That includes the law of the Constitution. The courts
have the authority to enforce the provisions of the Constitution and
void legislative acts that conflict with it, not because the Constitution
is written, but because they are courts functioning in a common law
system in which an independent judiciary is the institution through
which the legal rights of individuals and legal constraints on

government are enforced.177
This point is probably easiest to grasp by distinguishing judicial
review with respect to state and federal legislation. Historically, the
ability of the federal government to control conflicting actions of state
governments was a preoccupation of the Philadelphia Convention.1 78
As the convention debates unfolded, this constitutional concern was
ultimately resolved through the institutional authority of federal
courts to rely upon the Supremacy Clause in voiding state legislation
that conflicts with the Constitution or federal law, and this authority

may be discerned in the text of the Supremacy Clause itself.1 79 The

174. Some have argued that the Constitution was meant to function as supreme
law solely with respect to state acts, and that the courts' authority to declare federal acts
void was similarly limited. Cf. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE ESSENTIAL HOLMES:
SELECTIONS FROM THE LETTERS, SPEECHES, JUDICIAL OPINIoNS, AND OTHER WRITINGS
OF OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR. 147 (Richard A. Posner ed., 1992) ("I do not think the

United States would come to an end if we lost our power to declare an Act of Congress
void. I do think that the Union would be imperiled if we could not make that declaration
as to the laws of the several States."). I will return to this distinction presently. See infra
notes 178-81 and accompanying text.
175. See Marbury, 5 U.S. at 177-80.
176. Henry P. Monaghan, Marbury and the Administrative State, 83 COLUM. L.
REV. 1, 14 (1983).
177. See supra notes 47, 80-81, 118.
178. See, e.g., Jack Rakove, The Legacy of the Articles of Confederation,12 PUBLIUS
45, 53-55 (1982); LACROIX, supra note 164, at 136-38.
179. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 ("[T]he Judges in every State shall be bound
thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary
notwithstanding."). For analysis of the discussion on this point at the Convention, see
James S. Liebman & William F. Ryan, "Some Effectual Power": The Quantity and Quality
of DecisionmakingRequired of Article III Courts, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 696, 730, 744-45,
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topics of judicial authority and the language of the Supremacy Clause
were addressed together at the convention and were understood to
relate directly to one another,1 80 and the principal concern was
controlling the power of states to contravene the Constitution and the
federal government.181 So we can see more clearly why Marshall relied
in Marbury on the common law rather than the Constitution as the
basis of the judicial authority he articulated-the case involved review

of federal, not state, legislation, and this was not the instance of
judicial authority that had been discussed at the convention and was
translated most directly into the Constitution through the Supremacy
Clause and Article III.182 Although the underlying common law nature
of the judicial authority remained fundamentally the same, the
Constitution itself did not serve well, in Marshall's day, as the basis for
83
articulating the judicial authority at issue in Marbury.1

The common law basis of the courts' authority in Marbury leads
to another frequent misconception. As Marshall acknowledges, the
courts' jurisdiction may be defined constitutionally or statutorily in
various respects;1 84 however, their jurisdiction cannot be constrained

762-63, 766, 770 (1998); Robert H. Birkby, Politicsof Accommodation: The Origin of the
Supremacy Clause, 19 W. POL. Q. 123, 134-35 (1966).
180. See Liebman & Ryan, supra note 179, at 771 ("Read, as designed, in
conjunction with the Supremacy Clause, 'the judicial Power' means the Article III judge's
authority and obligation, in all matters over which jurisdiction is conferred,
independently, finally, and effectually to decide the whole case and nothing but the case
on the basis, and so as to maintain the supremacy, of the whole federal law."); see also
id. at 732-33.
181. See LACROIX, supranote 164, at 163-64; Liebman & Ryan, supra note 179, at
750-51.
182. To underscore the distinct bases for constitutional and judicial authority
under the US Constitution, it is worth noting, as David Currie has explained, that the
text of the Supremacy Clause, standing alone, could actually be read as authorizing
judicial review of state legislation but not of federal legislation. See David P. Currie, The
Constitution in the Supreme Court: The Powers of the Federal Courts, 1801-1835, 49 U.
CHI. L. REV. 646, 659 (1982) ("[I]f this interpretation is correct, the supremacy clause
furnishes a powerful argument againstjudicial review of Acts of Congress. Although the
clause plainly gives the Constitution the right of way over competing state law, it
appears to equate federal statutes with the Constitution by declaring them both
supreme law."').
James Madison and Common-Law
Konig,
David Thomas
183. Cf.
Constitutionalism, 28 LAw & HIST. REV. 507, 511 (2010) ("In defending a federal judiciary
that mediated between state and national authority and applied a 'supreme law of the
land,' therefore, Hamilton/Publius was restating the role of the common-law judge ...
[with respect to] what Article III accomplished by specifying only those 'Cases' and
'Controversies' within the jurisdiction of the 'Judicial power."').
184. See, e.g., Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 175 (1803) ("When an instrument
organizing fundamentally a judicial system, divides it into one supreme, and so many
inferior courts as the legislature may ordain and establish; then enumerates its powers,
and proceeds so far to distribute them, as to define the jurisdiction of the supreme court
by declaring the cases in which it shall take original jurisdiction, and that in others it
shall take appellate jurisdiction; the plain import of the words seems to be, that in one
class of cases its jurisdiction is original, and not appellate; in the other it is appellate,
and not original.").
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or extinguished in a manner that would preclude them from
determining whether the government was acting in violation of the
law.1 85 According to the institutional dynamics of the US system, this
is the functional operation of the Supremacy Clause as a constitutional
constraint on the actions of government: the federal courts ascertain
whether and when a government organ or official has violated the
Constitution through their ordinary operation as common law courts
determining the rights of litigants in the course of deciding cases. 186
This was the constitutional method of ensuring common law
constitutionalism within the US system, but the underlying principle
that government is accountable to the law through the operation of

ordinary courts resolving legal claims is characteristic of the common
law tradition itself, rather than an innovation of the US
Constitution.1 87 Even more, as Marshall recognized explicitly in
Marbury, it would defeat that system ab initio if the courts could not
enforce the provisions of the Constitution when they conflict with the

acts of a government official or organ.1 88 As Marshall described, there

185. See Monaghan, supra note 176, at 11 ("[T]here is no suggestion that the
judicial duty of article III courts 'to say what the law is' with regard to constitutional
questions varies with the nature of the case in which the question arises.... There is no
half-way position in constitutional cases; so long as it is directed to decide the case, an
article III court cannot be 'jurisdictionally' shut off from full consideration of the
substantive constitutional issues, at least absent adequate opportunity for consideration
of those claims in another article III tribunal."). For various applications of this principle,
see DeMore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 517 (2003); Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 603 (1988);
Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 365-67 (1974).
186.

See JAMES R. STONER, JR., COMMON-LAW LIBERTY: RETHINKING AMERICAN

CONSTITUTIONALISM 19 (2003) ("A[nother] place where the common-law way of thinking
appears in the Constitution is in the Supremacy Clause of Article VI. . . . What is
remarkable here is not the fact of federal supremacy but the manner in which it was to
be secured, namely, through the courts of law.... What made the unique arrangement
of American federalism possible, at least in the early years of the Republic, was its
mediation by a judiciary trained to focus not on abstract questions of sovereignty but on
questions of right and power as they arise in a particular case. This allowed the logic of
the novel system to be worked out over time, as issues developed.").
187. See generally R.C. VAN CAENEGEM, EUROPEAN LAW IN THE PAST AND THE
FUTURE: UNITY AND DIVERSITY OVER TWO MILLENNIA 42 (2002) ("[T]he government and

its officials are under the same law and the same courts as the citizen: what could more
clearly demonstrate the notion that both the governors and the governed have to live
under the same rule of law? . . . In England, so the classic doctrine goes, the ordinary
courts are competent for the judicial review of acts of administration: the officials of the
state do not constitute a separate, privileged class."); see also supra notes 117, 134.
188. See Marbury, 5 U.S. at 178 ("If then the courts are to regard the constitution;
and the constitution is superior to any ordinary act of the legislature; the constitution,
and not such ordinary act, must govern the case to which they both apply. Those then
who controvert the principle that the constitution is to be considered, in court, as a
paramount law, are reduced to the necessity of maintaining that courts must close their
eyes on the constitution, and see only the law. ... It would declare that an act, which,
according to the principles and theory of our government, is entirely void; is yet, in
practice, completely obligatory. ... That it thus reduces to nothing what we have deemed
the greatest improvement on political institutions-a written constitution-would of
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are important limits to the jurisdiction of the courts, but those limits
do not and cannot extend to precluding the courts from ruling on an
individual's claim that the government has violated his rights under

the law or the Constitution.1 89 That this judicial duty may fairly be
characterized as "ordinary" should be understood as a statement of its
regularity and necessity, but this judicial duty may equally be
characterized as extraordinary for its importance in actualizing the

0
commitment to constitutional government of the US system.19
The common law method of enforcing rule of law values through
the operation of ordinary courts reinforces the different bases for the

authority of the courts and of the Constitution. Article III created
federal courts within a common law legal tradition. As such, the federal
courts are common law courts whose traditional role and authority is

reaffirmed, rather than reinvented, by the language of the
Constitution.191 In this respect, the judicial authority described by
Article III preexisted in the traditional common law authority of the
courts of that system, which the framers adapted to the newly created
federal system of government: "Federal courts are common law courts.
. . . [T]he judicial power [is] imparted to us by Article III of the
Constitution and the court's common law power implicitly confirmed
by the seventh amendment."1 92 This is the reason that, in Marbury,

itself be sufficient, in America, where written constitutions have been viewed with so
much reverence, for rejecting the construction.").
189. See id. at 170, 171 ("The province of the court is, solely, to decide on the rights
of individuals. . . . If one of the heads of departments commits any illegal act, under the
color of his office, by which an individual sustains an injury, it cannot be pretended that
his office alone exempts him from being sued in the ordinary mode of proceeding, and
being compelled to obey the judgment of the law.... [I]t is not perceived on what ground
the courts of the country are further excused from the duty of giving judgment, that right
be done to an injured individual, than if the same services were to be performed by a
person not the head of a department.").
190. And of the UK system. See supra notes 117-18, 125 and accompanying text.
191. See JAMES BRYCE, 1 THE AMERICAN COMMONWEALTH 270-71 (1995) [1888]
("The functions of the [federal] judiciary . . . are the natural outgrowth of common law
doctrines and of the previous history of the colonies and states; all that is novel in them,
for it can hardly be called artificial, is the creation of courts coextensive with the sphere
of the national government."); Liebman & Ryan, supra note 179, at 752 ("[T]he
nationalists secured an all-important qualitative assurance via the extension of 'the
Judicial Power' to the specified categories of cases and controversies: Whenever called
upon to decide those matters, federal judges would be required to deploy the qualitiesthe decision-making powers and responsibilities-inherent in 'the Judicial Power' and
thus inherent in every court constituted by or under the judiciary article."). Generally
speaking, the federal courts develop federal common law only where federal legislation
does not directly address an issue, see Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S.
363, 367 (1943), or where state law is unavailable, see City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451
U.S. 304, 314 n.7 (1981). These aspects of the federal courts' operation within a federal
system of government do not change the underlying nature of the federal courts as
common law courts. See Flowers Transp., Inc. v. M/V Peanut Hollinger, 664 F.2d 112,
113 (5th Cir. 1981).
192. Point Landing, Inc. v. Omni Capital Int'l, Ltd., 795 F.2d 415, 431, 432 (5th
Cir. 1986) (en banc) (Wisdom, J., joined by Clark, Rubin, Politz, Johnson, and Williams,
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Marshall "simply extrapolates the judicial role in constitutional cases
from the 'ordinary and humble judicial duty' in conventional cases.
93
Law interpretation is what courts 'do."'1
This is an easy point to miss, because it is so tempting to think
that the writing of the Constitution changed everything. But it did not.
It created a new political system that was meant to protect against the
perceived political abuses of the British model of government while
maintaining the legal tradition in which the framers were trained and
whose rights and processes they prized.1 94 The judicial system of the
common law, and the rights defined by that system, were incorporated
within - the larger system of government envisioned by the
Constitution.195 The common law foundations of that constitutional
and judicial tradition were preserved through the drafting and

ratification of the written Constitution,1 96 although aspects of the

JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part). It is worth noting that the Supreme
Court's affirmance of Point Landing grounded the courts' personal jurisdiction upon
service of process, not under its Article III authority, but rather on the individual right
of due process under the Fifth Amendment. See Omni Capital Int'l, Ltd. v. Wolff, 484
U.S. 97, 104 (1987).
193. Monaghan, supra note 176, at 12.
194. See, e.g., JOHN PHILLIP REID, 1 CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN
REvOLUTION: THE AUTHORITY OF RIGHTS 237 (1987) ("American whigs began their

resistance in 1765 in the belief that Parliament was acting unconstitutionally.... They
were defending the constitution of limited government and of property in rights that once
had been the English constitution. They were rebelling against the constitution of
arbitrary power that the British constitution was about to become."); R.C. VAN
CAENEGEM, AN HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION TO WESTERN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 167-68

(1995); STONER, supra note 186, at 14, 15 ("[A]s the colonies re-formed themselves into
states, they all adopted, often by statute or constitutional provision, the common law as
the basis of their jurisprudence. . . . The decision of the colonies to adhere by and large
to their common-law tradition-indeed to make their case for independence by appeal to
the ancient rights they had by common law-makes it plain that, even as they introduced
the written constitution to the world, they had no intention of replacing the unwritten
law ... ").
195.

See generally JOHN V. ORTH, DUE PROCESS OF LAW: A BRIEF HISTORY 99

(2003) ("The common law, the 'law of the land,' was anterior to all constitutions. In
England, still lacking a written constitution, the common law itself supplied the rules
now described as constitutional. ... In America the U.S. Constitution declared itself 'the
supreme law of the land,' and constitutional amendments added the guarantee of due
process. That meant, in turn, that the judges would test legislation against the norms of
the common law."); G. Edward White, Recovering Coterminous Power Theory: The Lost
Dimension of Marshall Court Sovereignty Cases, in ORIGINS OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY:
ESSAYS ON THE JUDICIARY ACT OF 1789 68 (Maeva Marcus ed., 1992) ("[T]he common law

of England had become part of the 'laws of the United States' within the meaning of
Article III of the Constitution . . ."). White is discussing Ellsworth's judgment in
Williams' Case. See Williams' Case, 29 F. Cas. 1330, 1331 (C.C. Conn. 1799) (Ellsworth,
C.J.) ("The common law of this country remains the same as it was before the
Revolution.").
196. See REID, supra note 65, at 95 ("There was a stream of tradition that ... has
been lost on historians of our own day who believe that eighteenth-century events such
as the American Revolution can be explained without giving thought to the ideology of
English constitutionalism, or that the common law neither determined 'the kinds of
conclusions men would draw in the crisis of the [revolutionary] time' nor provided a guide
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tradition were adapted to the specific circumstances of colonial and
early US government. 197 In this respect, Marshall's reasoning in
Marbury reflects and reinforces his other judicial and extrajudicial
writings.1 98 So the unamended 1787 Constitution preserved the
preexisting common law tradition in the independent judiciary of

Article III with the authority to interpret and apply the law,1 99 along

for 'what to do next.' . . . [T]he common law led them to similar conclusions about
parliamentary authority.... This methodology helps to explain the persistent strength
of rule-of-law over the centuries in common-law jurisdictions. . . . It is a methodology
that has outlived the Tudors, the Stuarts, and the sovereignty of Parliament.").
197. See, e.g., Louis F. Del Duca & Alain A. Levasseur, Legal History and
Ethnology: Impact of Legal Culture and Legal Transplantson the Evolution of the U.S.
Legal System, 58 AM. J. COMP. L. 1, 3 (2010); Ellen E. Sward, A History of the Civil Trial
in the United States, 51 KAN. L. REV. 347, 371 (2003); McConnell, supra note 39, at 19697.
198. See, e.g., Livingston v. Jefferson, 15 F. Cas. 660, 665 (C.C. Va. 1811)
(Marshall, C.J.) ("This common law has been adopted by the legislature of Virginia. Had
it not been adopted, I should have thought it in force. When our ancestors migrated to
America, they brought with them the common law of their native country, so far as it
was applicable to their new situation; and I do not conceive that the Revolution would,
in any degree, have changed the relations of man to man, or the law which regulated
those relations. In breaking our political connection with the parent state, we did not
break our connection with each other.") (emphasis added); Letter from John Marshall to
St. George Tucker (Nov. 27, 1800), in 6 THE PAPERS OF JOHN MARSHALL:
CORRESPONDENCE,

PAPERS, AND SELECTED JUDICIAL OPINIONS, NOVEMBER

1800-

MARCH 1807 24 (Charles F. Hobson & Fredrika J. Teute eds., 1990) ("My own opinion is
that our ancestors brought with them the laws of England both statute & common law
as existing at the settlement of each colony, so far as they were applicable to our
situation. That on our revolution the preexisting law of each state remained so far as it
was not changed either expressly or necessarily by the nature of the governments which
we adopted. That on adopting the existing constitution of the United States the common
& statute law of each state remained as before & that the principles of the common law
of the state would apply themselves to magistrates of the general as well as to
magistrates of the particular government. I do not recollect ever to have heard the
opinions of a leading gentleman of the opposition which conflict with these.") (spelling
updated).
199. The language of Article III that protects judicial independence through life
tenure originates in the English statute that protects judges from parliamentary
influence and interference. CompareU.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 ("The Judges ... shall hold
their Offices during good Behaviour"), with Act of Settlement 1701, 12 & 13 Will. 3, c. 2,
§ 3 ("Judges Commissions be made Quam diu se bene Gesserint" [as long as he shall
behave himself well]). See Robert Stevens, The Act of Settlement and the Questionable
History of Judicial Independence, 1 OXFORD U. COMMONWEALTH L.J. 253, 261 (2001)
("Historically, the Act of Settlement marks the crossroads of the English Constitution.
The provisions of the Act . . . represented an inarticulate effort to have the kind of
separation of powers spelled out with much greater clarity at the Constitutional
Convention in Philadelphia 75 years later."). In "Federalist No. 78," Hamilton adverts to
the incorporation of the Act of Settlement within Article III. See THE FEDERALIST NO.
78, at 408 (Alexander Hamilton) (George W. Carey & James McClellan eds., 2001)
("[T]here can be no room to doubt, that the convention acted wisely in copying from the
models of those constitutions which have established good behaviour as the tenure of
judicial offices.. . . The experience of Great Britain affords an illustrious comment on the
excellence of the institution.").
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with rights of habeas corpus 200 and trial by jury. 201 And the substantive
individual rights of the common law tradition would soon follow,

enumerated two years later in the Bill of Rights. 202

The importance of the writing of the US Constitution occasionally
leads people to believe that the writing is necessarily the most
important aspect of the Constitution. But it is equally important to
remember that the concepts written into the Constitution were drawn

from its common law antecedents.

20 3

The common law is the

foundation for the federal judicial system created by the Constitution
and for the fundamental rights protected through their enforcement by
this judicial system. 204 In this respect, the authority of the Constitution
and of the courts are distinct and mutually reinforcing elements of the

rule of law as expressed in the charter document:
[I]t is impossible to appreciate fully the Supreme Court for what it was intended
to be if its common-law powers and duties are not recognized. But then, it is

200.
201.

See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3.

202. See, e.g., FORREST MCDONALD, NoVUs ORDO SECLORUM: THE INTELLEcTUAL
ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION 9-55 (1985); LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE BILL OF
RIGHTS (1999); ELIZABETH WICKS, THE EVOLUTION OF A CONSTITUTION: EIGHT KEY
MOMENTS IN BRITISH CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 26-28 (2006). Cf. Burmah Oil Co., Ltd.

.

v. Bank of Eng. [1980] AC 1090, 1145 (appeal taken from Eng.) ("Of course, the United
States have a written constitution and Bill of Rights. Nevertheless both derive from the
common law and British political philosophy."). For more on the relationship between
the common law rights written into the US Constitution and British political theory, see
John Phillip Reid, Another Origin of JudicialReview: The ConstitutionalCrisis of 1776
and the Need for a DernierJudge, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 963, 971, 972 (1989) ("[E]ighteenth
century American constitutional theory was seventeenth century English constitutional
theory. ... American constitutional principles were not sui generis, but were the taught
principles of common law constitutionalists.").
203. See, e.g., Smith v. Alabama, 124 U.S. 465, 478 (1888) ("The interpretation of
the Constitution of the United States is necessarily influenced by the fact that its
provisions are framed in the language of the English common law, and are to be read in
the light of its history."); Murray v. Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co., 62 F. 24, 27, 28 (C.C.N.D.
Iowa 1894), aff'd, 92 F. 868 (8th Cir. 1899) ("When the constitution of the United States
was adopted, it was based upon the general principles of the common law, and its correct
interpretation requires that the several provisions thereof shall be read in the light of
these general principles. The final disruption of all political ties between the colonies and
the mother country did not terminate the existence of the common law in the colonies.
.. The constitution itself recognizes the fact of the continued existence of the common
law, and indeed it is based upon the principles thereof, and its correct interpretation
requires that its provisions shall be read and construed in the light thereof."); STONER,
supra note 186, at 16-17.
204. See S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 231 (1917) (Pitney, J., dissenting)
("[I]t appears beyond question, that the Constitution, the Judiciary Act of 1789, and all
subsequent statutes upon the same subject, are based upon the general principles of the
common law, and that, to a large extent, the legislative and judicial action of the
government would be without support and without meaning if they cannot be interpreted
in the light of the common law."); United States v. Sanges, 144 U.S. 310, 311-12 (1892);
W. Union Tel. Co. v. Call Publ'g Co., 181 U.S. 92, 101-03 (1901); Ward v. Erie R.R. Co.,
230 N.Y. 230, 234 (1921) (Cardozo, J.), cert. denied, Erie R.R. Co. v. Ward, 256 U.S. 696
(1921).
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impossible to understand the United States Constitution itself if its considerable
dependence upon the common law is not recognized, a dependence so deep and
so extensive as to make it seem only natural that the Supreme Court should be
regarded as a vital part of the common-law system in this Country. The common
law is again and again taken for granted in the Constitution. Many of the terms
used ... have been shaped by centuries of the common law. Many of the rights
referred to, and guaranteed, by the Constitution and later by the Bill of Rights
depend for their detailed application upon the common law . .. 205

As with the UK constitution, thinking of the legal authority of the
US Constitution in relation to a rule of recognition demonstrates that
the writing of a constitution, standing alone, cannot establish the
authority of that constitution as a national charter of government.
Where the US Constitution is concerned, the political vision and public
prestige of its authors matter, of course, to its acceptance at the time
206
But the authority of its authors cannot
of ratification and over time.
sustain the authority of the Constitution without an ongoing
acceptance of its value as a principled articulation of a shared
commitment of its officials and citizens to be governed according to its
standards. 207 From the perspective of a rule of recognition, that
enduring authority can be found only in the actions and beliefs of the
officials empowered and constrained by the document. Similarly, the
authority of the judicial system created by the Constitution was not

and could not be created by the document itself. The authority of the
federal judiciary, then and now, is grounded in its application and
protection of the venerated processes and rights of the common law
tradition. This does not mean that the Constitution did nothing to
fashion the federal courts as a particular instantiation of common law
courts, with defined jurisdictional requirements, etc. 208 It does mean,
though, that we cannot accurately understand the federal courts in
isolation from their creation, identification and operation as common
law courts. 209
The historical basis for the federal courts' common law authority
is linked with an important theoretical point, as well. Hart explained
the constitutional basis for the courts' authority to interpret the
meaning of the constitution in this way:
'[T]he constitution is what the judges say it is' does not mean merely that
particular decisions of supreme tribunals cannot be challenged. At first sight the
spectacle seems paradoxical: here are courts exercising creative powers which
settle the ultimate criteria by which the validity of the very laws, which confer
upon them jurisdiction as judges, must . . . be tested. How can a constitution
confer authority to say what the constitution is? .... One form of 'formalist' error

205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
(Jackson,

Anastaplo, supranote 21, at 134.
See Raz, supra note 61, at 157-60.
See GARDNER, supra note 151, at 101-02; Raz, supra note 61, at 173-76.
See generally U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
See, e.g., D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447, 468-72 (1942)
J., concurring); United States v. Brown, 331 F.2d 362, 365 (10th Cir. 1964).
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may perhaps just be that of thinking that every step taken by a court is covered
by some general rule conferring in advance the authority to take it, so that its
creative powers are always a form of delegated legislative power. The truth may
be that, when courts settle previously unenvisaged questions concerning the
most fundamental constitutional rules, they get their authority to decide them
accepted after the questions have arisen and the decision has been given. Here
2
all that succeeds is success. 10

In this passage, Hart is describing the momentous circumstance
of Marshall deciding Marbury (and his specific reference to the courts'
authority "to say what the constitution is" suggests that this
circumstance was exactly what he had in mind). 21 1 In determining the
basis for the courts' authority to say what the constitution is, Marshall
was in the situation of determining the validity of the laws that
conferred the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court upon the court. But as
Hart recognized, the paradox only exists as a result of the formalist
error of assuming that the courts' authority to decide must be
delegated as a legislative power in the form of the Constitution or the

Judiciary Act of 1789. Here again is the importance of recognizing that
Marshall did not commit this error because he did not assume that the
courts' authority must be delegated by the written Constitution. He
located the authority of the courts in their preexisting common law
powers and duties. Since the Constitution is a form of law, Marshall
said, the authority of the courts to say what the constitution is comes
from their common law function as courts, not from the Constitution.
The most fundamental error in assuming that the written US
Constitution is what grants US courts the authority to declare
legislation unconstitutional is not just that the US Constitution does
not mention this authority, it is that the US Constitution could not
impart this authority to courts even if it did mention this authority.

What allows the courts to possess this authority is not what the
Constitution says, it is what the officials of the system think and do.
The rule of recognition is what ultimately determines whether the
courts possess the authority to interpret the Constitution. And, again,
Marbury itself is the best historical demonstration of this. The power
of the federal courts to invalidate unconstitutional legislation was not
established simply because Marshall said in Marbury that the courts
have this power. Marshall's statement was just the first step. The
courts have this power because the other officials of the federal
government recognized and respected the Supreme Court's judgment
as an authoritative statement of the Constitution's meaning. The acts
and attitudes of these officials toward the Supreme Court's judgment
is what established Marbury as an authoritative source of

210. THE CONcEPT OF LAW, supra note 26, at 152, 153.
211. Id.
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21 2
This is
constitutional law according to the US rule of recognition.
to
authority
their
get
courts
the
says
that
he
what Hart means when
us
reminded
Goldsworthy
As
given.
been
has
decide after the decision
with regard to the UK constitution, the courts cannot determine the
meaning of the constitution by themselves. The same is true of the US

Constitution.
As Hart understood, the crucial distinction here is not between
courts operating with or without a written constitution. A constitution,
written or unwritten, cannot establish its own meaning or force.
Instead, according to Hart, the rule of recognition in that legal system
determines the meaning and effect of that constitution. And according
to the rules of recognition in the United States and the United
Kingdom, the courts ultimately determine the meaning of the (written
or unwritten) constitution because the courts' judgments acquire their

authority as legal sources by virtue of their reception by the other
officials of government.2 13 So the power of judicial review described by

Marshall in Marbury did not and could not depend upon the
articulation of this power in a written charter. It could only depend, in
the end, on its recognition as a power of the courts by the officials and
institutions governed by the constitutional principles that the court

articulated. The rule of law is actualized in the United States through
the courts' judgments holding officials of the government accountable
to the law, and the courts' judgments of what the law requires govern

those officials because those officials consider themselves bound by the
courts' judgments. All that succeeds is success.

IV. CONCLUSION

The United States and the United Kingdom have taken different
historical and constitutional paths toward reconciling democratic
government and the rule of law. The United States wrote down and

212. On the reception and acceptance of Marbury by officials of the federal
government (and the public), see Maeva Marcus, JudicialReview in the Early Republic,
&

in LAUNCHING THE "EXTENDED REPUBLIC": THE FEDERALIST ERA 25 (Ronald Hoffman

Peter J. Albert eds., 1996); NELSON, supra note 143, at 107.
213. See generally Kenneth Einar Himma, Understanding the Relationship
Between the U.S. Constitutionand the Conventional Rule of Recognition, in THE RULE OF
RECOGNITION AND THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 109 (Matthew D. Adler & Kenneth Einar

Himma eds., 2009) ("Even when there is widespread disagreement among officials about
whether a Supreme Court decision is 'correct' as a matter of constitutional law, officials
cooperate by treating the decision as the law. Enforcement agencies decline to enforce a
law that the Court has declared unconstitutional even if they think the decision
mistaken. . . . [A]s a matter of legal practice, officials generally regard one another as
under an institutional duty to defer to the Court's validity decisions. . . . This has an
important consequence: such behavior indicates that officials are self-consciously
practicing a recognition norm that confers upon the Court final authority to decide
whether a duly enacted norm conforms to the substantive norms of the Constitution.");
see also supra notes 90-97 and accompanying text.
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publicly ratified its charter. The UK constitution evolved over time
through institutional dynamics. Many theorists seize upon this
distinction between a written and an unwritten constitution as the
foundational difference between the two legal systems' method of
protecting rule of law values and constraining government power:
One answer to the question how can constitutionalism be protected against
parliamentary sovereignty is that we [in the UK] should follow the examples of
many Western democracies and adopt an entrenched written constitution which
would limit Parliament's power . . . [by] granting the courts, or the Supreme or
Constitutional Court, the power to disapply or invalidate provisions in Acts and
other laws which are incompatible with the Constitution. Such a provision in a
written constitution ... could provide the courts with the legitimacy for
overriding
a
statutory
provision which they lack under current
arrangements.

2 14

As this passage indicates, these theorists assume that a written
constitution alters the constitutional allocation of authority between
the legislature and the courts in granting the courts the power to
invalidate unconstitutional legislation, and in providing a written
charter against which the courts could then measure and constrain the

powers of the government. And these scholars assume that this is the
distinction that empowers US courts, but not UK courts, to invalidate
unconstitutional government action. However, rather than focusing on
the writing, we should focus on what was written.
The independent institutional position of US and UK courts, and
the protection of constitutional rights and the subjection of the state to
constitutional rules through the ordinary judicial process reflects the
common law tradition in which both systems of government exist. The
institutional independence of US courts, the fundamental rights
protected by the constitution, and the rule of law values according to
which government action is legitimated and constrained, which are
found in the written US Constitution, all originated in the English
common law tradition. Historically and theoretically, traced through
the writings of Hale, Dicey, Hart, Madison, Marshall, and many others,
we find that the protection of constitutional rights and constitutional
values through the ordinary judicial process of independent courts is

the traditional method by which the rule of law and democratic
government have been preserved. There are, without question, many
important structural differences between the US and the UK forms of
government: the separation of powers in the United States and the
"fusion" of executive and legislative functions in the United Kingdom,
the presidential system of the United States and the parliamentary
system of the United Kingdom, theories of originalism and

214. Oliver, supra note 138, at 316-17. Oliver does not believe the UK should grant
this authority to courts under a written constitution. See id. at 317 ("I would not favour
this.").
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interpretivism in the United States and the ultra vires theory and
common law constitutionalism in the United Kingdom, judicial
"supremacy" in the United States and parliamentary sovereignty in
and the different means of political
the United Kingdom,

representation in the Senate and House of Representative in the
United States and the House of Lords and the House of Commons in
the United Kingdom, just to name some of the most conspicuous

examples. All of these matter.
In studying the genuine differences between the United States
and the United Kingdom, we should not become overly distracted by
the fact that the US Constitution is written. We should not assume
that the writing of the US Constitution is what granted to US courts
the power to invalidate unconstitutional legislation and government
action.21 5 For one thing, the written US Constitution does not contain
a provision granting this power to the courts. That is one reason that
Marshall wrote Marbury. But in writing Marbury, Marshall did not
invent the concept or power of judicial review; he referred to a judicial
practice already in existence. And that is why, in writing Marbury, he
differentiated the authority of the Constitution and the authority of
the courts, and why he grounded the Constitution's authority in the
text and the courts' authority in the common law.

The United States and the United Kingdom have developed their
own distinctive approaches to maintaining the rule of law and popular
sovereignty. Contemporary theorists of parliamentary sovereignty

tend to assume that democracy and the rule of law are irreconcilable
principles. Goldsworthy, for example, seems to hold this view because
he understands democracy to mean only representative democracy,
and he understands the rule of law to impose legal constraints on the
representative branch of government. He never fully considers the
challenges posed for his view by constitutional democracy. 216 Instead,
Goldsworthy maintains a fairly limited, and highly idealized,
conception of democracy:
I regret the contemporary loss of faith in the old democratic ideal of government
by ordinary people, elected to represent the opinions and interests of ordinary
people. According to this ideal, ordinary people have a right to participate on
equal terms in the political decision-making that affects their lives as much as
anyone else's, and should be presumed to possess the intelligence, knowledge and
21 7
virtue needed to do so.

215. And we should not assume that grounding the courts' authority to review
government action on the Constitution will necessarily result in greater protection of
individuals from the government or greater constraints on the government. See James
E. Pfander, Dicey's Nightmare: An Essay on The Rule of Law, 107 CALIF. L. REV. 737,
783-87 (2019).
216. See Rule Britannia, supra note 48, at 328.
217. CONTEMPORARY DEBATES, supra note 8, at 9-10. Goldsworthy seems to
subscribe to the "folk theory" of democracy with its assumptions about the faithful and
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Of course, one might reasonably wonder where "the old democratic
ideal of government by ordinary people" was supposed to exist. Not in
Athens, 21 8 Rome, 219 the United Kingdom, 22 0 or the United States,22 1 at
least. The notion of government by "ordinary people" is not terribly old,
and it also is not the only ideal of democracy. And one might reasonably
wonder whether elected representatives do actually represent the
opinions and interests of ordinary people, and whether they try to. To

be fair, Goldsworthy does at least acknowledge that these doubts
exist, 22 2 although his insistence that this is a "loss of faith" suggests
that he views this as a contemporary problem rather than a
longstanding historical one.
Leaving these difficulties with his view to one side, my immediate
concern is Goldsworthy's persistent refusal or inability to see that
genuine democratic systems of government (constitutional or

accurate representation of populist preferences in policymaking and governance. See
Christopher H. Achen & Larry M. Bartels, DEMOCRACY FOR REALISTS: WHY ELECTIONS
Do NOT PRODUCE RESPONSIVE GOVERNMENT 21-23 (2017).
218. See, e.g., SCOTT GORDON, CONTROLLING THE STATE: CONSTITUTIONALISM
FROM ANCIENT ATHENS TO TODAY 66-67 (1999). Gordon's point here (and mine) is not

that Athens was not a democratic form of government, but rather that it was not a
government of the people, by the people, in the sense that Goldsworthy has in mind.
219. See, e.g., Allen M. Ward, How Democratic Was the Roman Republic?, 31 N.E.
CLASSICAL J. 101, 108 (2004) ("For a state to be democratic in some meaningful way, it
is necessary that the mechanisms of popular sovereignty operate democratically even if
that sovereignty might ultimately be limited or balanced by other elements to prevent
the abuse of popular power. Moreover, the extra-constitutional social and cultural milieu
must not thwart the democratic exercise of popular sovereignty. The Roman Republic
failed on both counts.").
220. See GORDON, supra note 218, at 234 ("The franchise in seventeenth-century
England was severely restricted, and remained so until the latter part of the nineteenth
century, so the few that sat in the House of Commons were the elected representatives
of only a somewhat larger few.").
221. The concerns of the framers of the US Constitution regarding "excessive
democracy" and the steps taken in the document to guard against those concerns are
well known. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison); Letter from Alexander
Hamilton to Theodore Sedgwick (July 10, 1804), in 10 THE WORKS OF ALEXANDER
HAMILTON 458 (Henry Cabot Lodge ed., 1904) ("[Democracy is] our real disease ... the
poison of which, by a subdivision, will only be the more concentrated in each part, and
consequently the more virulent."). Without question, the institutional changes
occasioned by the 17th Amendment, and the representational changes initiated by the
15th, 19th, 24th, and 26th Amendments, have expanded the ability of "ordinary"
Americans "to participate on equal terms in the political decision-making that affects
their lives." Needless to say, the need for the Amendments underscores the 1787
Constitution's intended constraints on that participation. And some scholars doubt that
these Amendments did meaningfully remedy the US Constitution's "undemocratic"
nature. See, e.g., SANFORD LEVINSON, OUR UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION: WHERE THE
CONSTITUTION GOES WRONG (AND How WE THE PEOPLE CAN CORRECT IT) (2006);
ROBERT A. DAHL, How DEMOCRATIC IS THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION? (2d ed. 2003). In

any event, the authors of the US Constitution did not share Goldsworthy's anodyne view
of democracy, and his conception of democracy does not reflect the realities of American
constitutional development.

See STANLEY ELKINS & ERIC MCKITRiCK, THE AGE OF

FEDERALISM: THE EARLY AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1788-1800 309-11, 354-55 (1993).
222.

See CONTEMPORARY DEBATES, supra note 8, at 10.
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otherwise) might necessitate both electoral representation and
independent judiciaries.2 2 3 Both are needed to ensure that the ideal of
224
democratic government can function effectively in the real world.

Moreover, Goldsworthy cannot sidestep the practical issues by
claiming that he wishes to have a purely philosophical discussion,
because he never squarely confronts the core philosophical question
that underlies (and undermines) his argument:
A democrat may believe in the ideal of democracy, which may consist solely ...
on the ground that people and their preferences should be treated equally when
votes are counted. Or he may subscribe to a broader conception of democracy
whereby certain rights and freedoms must be guaranteed to individuals in order
225
for a regime to count as a democracy.

Goldsworthy never meaningfully engages with the notion that

democracy might be defined as something other than just the votes or
views of the majority. 226 And he never truly considers the possibility
that democracy and the rule of law are reconcilable, for example,
through an understanding of constitutional democracy as a societal

223. See Annabelle Lever, Democracy and Judicial Review: Are They Really
Incompatible?, 7 PERSP. ON PoL. 805, 810-11 (2009) ("There is, therefore, no warrant for
the view that legislatures are more representative than judiciaries on democratic
grounds, or for supposing that judicial review is a threat to democratic forms of
representation. Put simply, we can value democratic government and the scope for
representation that it presents without supposing that democratic government
mandates only one form of representation, or any particular balance between judicial
and legislative institutions."). See also id. at 814-15.
224. See, e.g., LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 177 (rev. ed. 1969) ("The two
fundamental processes of decision that characterize a democratic society are: decision by
impartial judges and decision by the vote of an electorate or a representative body.");
JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 88 (1980)
[is] entirely supportive
("[A] representation-reinforcing approach to judicial review ...
of, the underlying premises of the American system of representative democracy."). Ely
was writing with the US in mind, but as Fuller's more general statement makes clear,
Ely's point can reasonably be extended to any system that inherited English legal
traditions. Members of the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom have expressed a
similar view. See also supra note 133.
225. Cecile Fabre, A Philosophical Argument for a Bill of Rights, 30 BRIT. J. POL.
SCI. 77, 96 (2000). Richard Kay argues that the exercise of judicial review by
constitutional courts manifests a form of "mixed government" that can encompass
representative democracy without necessitating a democratic justification for the
existence of the courts' review power. See Richard S. Kay, Democracy, Mixed Government
and Judicial Review, in LAW UNDER A DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION: ESSAYS IN HONOUR
OF JEFFREY GOLDSWORTHY 224-25 (Lisa Burton Crawford, Patrick Emerton & Dale
Smith eds., 2019).
226. See Ronald Dworkin, FREEDOM'S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE
AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 17, 20, 23-25, 32-33 (1996); JOSEPH RAz, ETHICS IN THE
PUBLIC DOMAIN: ESSAYS IN THE MORALITY OF LAW AND POLITICS 375-76 (rev. ed. 1994);

Samuel Freeman, Political Liberalism and the Possibility
Constitution, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 619, 659 (1994).

of A Just Democratic
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precommitment to fundamental rights enforced by an independent

judiciary. 22 7
At the heart of constitutional democracy is the commitment to be
governed only in accordance with laws that we have, in some recondite
but real way, had a role in effectuating. And constitutional democracy
requires that government cannot act outside of the legal prescriptions
and precommitments that govern and legitimate its actions. In this
important sense, acts of the government that conflict with the
constitution also conflict with this conception of democracy. 2 28 As
expressions of constitutional democracy, the sovereignty of Parliament
in the United Kingdom and the writtenness of the Constitution in the
United States can be fully understood only from within the distinctive
UK and US legal traditions of which they are a part, and only from
within the common law tradition of which the United Kingdom and the
United States are a part. 229 Parliamentary sovereignty and the US

227. See supra notes 107, 133 and accompanying text; see also Samuel Freeman,
ConstitutionalDemocracy and the Legitimacy of Judicial Review, 9 LAW & PHIL. 327,
353-55 (1990); Lever, supra note 223, at 814.
228. See Ahmed [2010] UKSC 2 at [45] (Lord Hope) ("Conferring an unlimited
discretion on the executive as to how those resolutions, which it has a hand in making,
are to be implemented seems to me to be wholly unacceptable. It conflicts with the basic
rules that lie at the heart of our democracy."). See also supra notes 103-08, 124-27 and
accompanying text.
229. Dan Priel argues that the US and the UK no longer exemplify the same
approach to the authority of the common law. See Dan Priel, Conceptions of Authority
and the Anglo-American Common Law Divide, 65 AM. J. COMP. L. 609 (2017). According
to Professor Priel's typology, the United Kingdom (and the rest of the Commonwealth
nations) adhere primarily to the traditional practice conception of the common law,
according to which the common law's authority derives from the considered view of
trained legal professionals over time. See id. at 624-25. In contrast, the US shifted
during the twentieth century toward customary and will-based conceptions that now
predominate. See id. at 614-15, 639. These conceptions base the authority of the common
law, respectively, on shared norms of a community that legitimate legal sources insofar
as these sources express or cohere with the customary rules, see-id. at 631-32, and on
the will of a designated sovereign expressed through law, see id. at 634. In arguing that
the UK and the US no longer share a "common law commonality," because of these
disparate views of the common law's authority, Priel's view might be taken as a challenge
to my argument that their shared (though distinctive) lineage as common law systems
helps us to see the related mistakes of exaggerating the importance of either
parliamentary sovereignty in the UK or the writtenness of the Constitution in the US or
of differentiating the importance of the courts in maintaining the rule of law values of
the common law tradition in each nation on the basis of parliamentary sovereignty or
the written US Constitution. I cannot respond comprehensively to Professor Priel here.
The clearest and most direct way for me to explain my disagreement with Priel is to focus
on his core claim that the US no longer meaningfully endorses the practice theory of
common law authority. See id. at 642-45. As evidence for this claim, Priel emphasizes
the extent to which a nation's judges refer to and rely on the judgments of judges from
other common law jurisdictions. As he puts it, the practice view "will tend to be
sympathetic to commonality among legal systems if they have a shared historical origin.
Since authority on this view has its basis in history, the law of another jurisdiction can
be significant (and compelling even if not binding) as long as the two legal systems have
a shared history and can see themselves as belonging to the same 'tradition.' And here
obviously, the relevant tradition invoked is the 'common law tradition.'" Id. at 630. And
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Constitution depend for their authority, in the end, on their recognition
of the rule of law values on which they are grounded, historically and
conceptually. On this account, it is no historical or conceptual accident
that the United Kingdom and the United States were common law
systems before and after their respective recognition of parliamentary
sovereignty and a codified charter.

according to Priel, "American courts used to cite English cases ... relatively frequently,
but rarely do so anymore ... " Id. at 614-15. As just one significant example to rebut
Priel's assertion, in the US Supreme Court's leading judgments determining the legality
of the US government's various responses to the September 11, 2001 attacks, the justices
of the Court repeatedly cite English cases. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 55657, 560 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 481-82 (2004), and
503-04 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 660 (2006) (Scalia,
J., dissenting); Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 741-42, 745, 749-52 (2008), and 84447 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Of course, I have not mentioned the Supreme Court's citations
to English statutes and legal scholarship or the decisions of lower federal courts that cite
UK sources. My point here is not to deny or downplay the material differences between
the US and UK legal systems. My goal here is instead to help us concentrate on what
truly are the material differences. Although Professor Priel's claim that the US is
somewhat more parochial than other common law nations may well be correct, that has
much more to do with contested views of constitutional interpretation (which Priel does
not consider), and the number of jurisdictions in the federal and state judicial systems
(as Priel notes), than with the notion that the US is an isolated outlier that has
abandoned the practice conception of legal authority reflected in the rest of the common
law world. In this connection, I should also mention that the UK Supreme Court also
occasionally indicates its disinclination to consider the rulings of other common law
jurisdictions when determining the meaning of the UK constitution. See, e.g., Privacy
Int'l [2019] UKSC 22 at [102]-[103].
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